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HERE is a remarkable difference between the black-letter 
contract laws of England and the United States. In England, 
and in most civil-law countries, the existence of a contract depends, 
at least in theory, on the parties’ intent to be bound. The rule dates 
to the Court of Appeals’ 1919 refusal to enforce a husband’s prom-
ise to his wife, on the grounds that “the parties did not intend that 




tion 21 of the Second Restatement of Contracts adopts something 
like the opposite rule: “Neither real nor apparent intention that a 
promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a con-
tract.”2 In neither England nor the United States is an intent to be 
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article has greatly 
benefited from several presentations to my colleagues at Georgetown and at SMU 
Dedman School of Law, the University of Georgia Law School, and Yale Law School. 
I also thank Kerry Abrams, Chris Elmendorf, Brandon Garrett, Jed Purdy, Christian 
Turner, Robin West, and Eyal Zamir for comments on earlier drafts, and Jason 
Daniels, Conrad Deitrick, Allison Meredith, and Gregory Zlotnick for excellent re-
search assistance. 
1 Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579. 
2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 (1981). 
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legally bound sufficient to create a contract. An agreement must, 
for example, be supported by consideration. But in England, such 
an intent is said to be necessary, while the Second Restatement 
says that it is not.3
A closer look, however, reveals a more complex picture. For ex-
ample, the enforcement of a preliminary agreement in the United 
States “depends on whether [the parties] intend to be bound.”4 In 
Pennsylvania, a written gratuitous promise is enforceable if it “con-
tains an additional express statement, in any form of language, that 
the signer intends to be legally bound.”5 The comments to Section 
21 suggest that in the case of domestic agreements and social ar-
rangements, “some unusual manifestation of intention is necessary 
to create a contract.”6 And the Minnesota Supreme Court has re-
fused to enforce a reporter’s confidentiality promise to a source 
because it was “not persuaded that in the special milieu of media 
newsgathering a source and a reporter ordinarily believe they are 
engaged in making a legally binding contract.”7 Furthermore, it 
turns out that England’s more general intent requirement is not so 
meaningful in practice. A presumption that commercial agree-
ments are intended to be legally binding, together with other evi-
dentiary rules, means that, as P.S. Atiyah observes, in most cases it 
is “more realistic to say that no positive intention to enter into le-
gal relations needs to be shown.”8 These differences between and 
within the U.S. and English laws of contract are all the more re-
markable because they have been so little remarked upon. The di-
vergence between the black-letter English and Restatement rules is 
among the starkest differences between the jurisdictions’ laws of 
3 While § 21 accurately represents the rule in almost all U.S. jurisdictions, the 
United States is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG). Article 14(1) of the CISG establishes something 
like the English rule for contracts for the international sale of goods: “A proposal for 
concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if 
it . . . indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance.” United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 14, Apr. 11, 
1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1980), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.  
4 E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217, 253 (1987). 
5 33 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6 (1997). 
6 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 cmt. c (1981). 
7 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990). 
8 P.S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract 153 (5th ed. 1995). 
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contract. Yet scholars on this side of the Atlantic have paid little 
attention to Section 21, or to the supposed exceptions to it. This 
neglect is surprising not only because of the doctrinal tensions—the 
difference between the English and Restatement rules, and be-
tween Section 21 and exceptions to it—but also because the par-
ties’ contractual intent is of obvious theoretical interest. It is much 
easier to justify holding a person legally liable for the violation of a 
legal duty she chose to undertake than it is for one that she in-
curred by accident. Randy Barnett goes so far as to argue that li-
ability for breach of contract is justified only if the parties mani-
fested an intent to be bound.9 Thomas Scanlon argues that 
expectation damages are justified only when the parties had such 
an intent, and that otherwise reliance is the right measure.10 And 
Dori Kimel maintains that the English rule is necessary to protect 
from legal interference the special relationships morally binding 
promises create.11 The parties’ contractual intent should also be 
highly relevant from the perspective of economic theory, which for 
the past thirty years has been the dominant mode of analysis 
among contract scholars in the United States. Whether or not the 
parties intended legal liability affects the incentives the law creates, 
for legal incentives have traction only on parties who expect legal 
liability. And the parties’ intent to be legally bound is strong evi-
dence of the efficiency of legal enforcement, since informed parties 
will choose enforcement only when it creates value for them.12
9 Consider, for example, the following claim of Barnett’s: 
In a system of entitlements where manifested rights transfers are what justify 
the legal enforcement of agreements, any such manifestation necessarily implies 
that one intends to be “legally bound,” to adhere to one’s commitment. There-
fore, the phrase “a manifestation of an intention to be legally bound” neatly 
captures what a court should seek to find before holding that a contractual obli-
gation has been created. 
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 304 (1986) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules 
and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 861 (1992) [hereinafter Barnett, Sound 
of Silence] (“To make a contract according to this approach . . . a party must explicitly 
or implicitly manifest assent to be legally bound.”). 
10 T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in The Theory of Contract: New Essays 86, 
104 (P. Benson ed., 2001). 
11 Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract 
136–39 (2003). 
12 Eric Posner propounds a version of the second claim: 
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This Article examines various common-law rules that condition 
the enforcement of an agreement on the parties’ intent to contract. 
It treats the question of contractual intent primarily as a design 
problem. Assuming arguendo that the law sometimes wants to con-
dition the legal enforcement of an agreement on the parties’ mani-
fest intent that it be enforceable or nonenforceable, what rules 
should the law use to do so? Rules for determining whether the 
parties, at the time of formation, intended to contract are rules of 
interpretation, and I recommend evaluating them using the famil-
iar theory of contractual default and opt-out rules described by Ian 
Ayres and Robert Gertner.13 That framework allows me to identify 
four general approaches to interpreting the parties’ intent to con-
tract. Each is defined by, first, whether it adopts an enforcement or 
nonenforcement interpretive default and, second, whether it re-
quires parties with non-default intentions to state their intentions 
expressly or instructs courts to determine their intent by looking at 
all the available evidence. 
When evaluating the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
these interpretive approaches, there are several special considera-
tions to take into account. The first is the asymmetry of the default 
question when the parties’ intent is among the conditions of con-
tractual validity. In some cases, parties do not intend to contract 
 Economics assumes that people exchange promises when both benefit from 
the exchange, but it does not follow that the law should enforce all promises. 
Courts make errors, and legal sanctions are sometimes clumsier than nonlegal 
sanctions. As a result, people who make and receive promises often do not ex-
pect, and would not want, courts to provide legal remedies if the promisor 
breaks the promise. But when the promisor wants the promise to be legally en-
forceable, and the promisee expects the promise to be legally enforceable, 
courts should enforce promises. 
 Economics, then, implies that courts should enforce promises when parties 
want their promises to be enforceable, and not otherwise. 
Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or 
Failure?, 112 Yale L.J. 829, 849–50 (2003) (footnotes omitted); see also Lisa Bern-
stein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Imma-
nent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1788–95 (1996); Sidney W. DeLong, 
The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estop-
pel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 943, 951–58. 
13 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling 
Gaps]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1591 (1999) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian]. 
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not because they intend not to contract, but because they do not 
have a preference one way or the other or because the possibility 
of legal enforcement has not occurred to them. In such circum-
stances, the parties do not have the knowledge necessary to opt out 
of a legal default purposively. This fact is a problem if the goal is to 
impose liability only on parties who intend it, for it follows that an 
enforcement default with an express opt-out rule will be systemati-
cally stickier than a nonenforcement default. In other words, fewer 
parties who would, on balance, prefer the non-default interpreta-
tion of their agreement will get it. The second point concerns a 
special advantage of sticky defaults in determining the conditions 
of contractual validity. This advantage is premised on the idea that 
there is sometimes a social interest in imposing duties on parties 
for reasons other than their antecedent choice or preference. 
Sticky defaults can serve that interest. Put another way, sticky en-
forcement defaults serve the duty-imposing function of contract 
law, while at the same time recognizing and enabling the purposive 
use of contract as a legal power. The last point concerns the costs 
of expressly opting-out of either an enforcement or a nonenforce-
ment default. These include not only the out-of-pocket costs usu-
ally associated with contracting around a default, but in many 
transactions relational costs as well. Interpretive rules that require 
parties who want, or who do not want, legal liability expressly to 
say so can interfere with and erode extralegal forms of trust that 
otherwise create value in transactions. 
The Article applies this analytic framework to evaluate the best 
rule for interpreting the parties’ contractual intent in four types of 
transactions: gratuitous promises, preliminary agreements, spousal 
agreements, and reporters’ promises of confidentiality. To the ex-
tent that we want to condition the enforcement of such agreements 
on the parties’ intent to contract, the analysis recommends differ-
ent rules for the different transaction types. I criticize, for example, 
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott’s proposed efficiency-based test 
for the enforcement of preliminary agreements, and suggest in-
stead a requirement that parties who want such agreements to be 
legally binding say so. With respect to agreements between 
spouses, on the contrary, I take recent feminist critiques to recom-
mend an enforcement default, though I argue that the relational 
costs of expressly opting out of enforcement recommend examin-
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ing the totality of the circumstances for evidence that the parties 
intended no legal enforcement. The discussion of these transaction 
types illuminates the special concerns for the law each raises. It 
also demonstrates the value of the proposed analytic framework. 
From the perspective of contract theory, the analysis shows how 
different rules for interpreting the parties’ intent with respect to le-
gal liability strike different balances between the sometimes con-
flicting reasons the law has for holding promisors liable for their 
breaches. I have argued elsewhere that a distinctive feature of con-
tract law is that it is at the same time a power-conferring and a 
duty-imposing rule.14 Rules for interpreting the parties’ contractual 
intent are tools for balancing these different, sometimes conflicting 
functions. This provides the material for a deeper understanding of 
the generic rule in Section 21, which holds that the parties’ contrac-
tual intent is not a condition of their legal liability, but also allows 
that a manifest intent not to be bound can prevent the formation of 
a contract. 
This Article focuses on attempts in the United States and Eng-
land to condition contract enforcement on the parties’ initial intent 
to contract. As I note in the next Part, intent-to-contract require-
ments are a common feature of civil-law systems. It would be ex-
tremely interesting also to examine judicial application of these 
rules. There is no reason to assume that the experiences of com-
mon-law courts, with their adversarial procedures, lay juries, and 
generalist judges, is the same as that of courts in other legal sys-
tems. It may well be that intent-to-contract requirements work dif-
ferently or serve different purposes in those contexts. But that is 
not the subject of this Article, whose claims and conclusions relate 
only to the common law of contract. 
Finally, a word about terminology. This Article is about the legal 
relevance of parties’ intentions with respect to legal enforcement. 
It assumes that a person might intend to enter into an agreement 
without intending that the agreement be legally enforceable—that 
she might intend to undertake a moral or personal duty to perform 
without intending to undertake a legal duty to do so. This Article 
uses several different formulations to describe an intent to under-
14 Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726 (2008). 
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take the legal duty, including “intent to be bound,” “intent to con-
tract,” and “contractual intent.” As I note in the next Part, in some 
contexts these phrases can be interpreted only as an intent to 
agree, or whatever intention the law requires to make a contract. 
In this Article, however, they denote the parties’ intent to be le-
gally bound, or that their agreement be legally enforceable. 
Part I of the Article summarizes the U.S. and English black-
letter rules on the relevance of the parties’ contractual intent. Part 
II describes the English experience with an intent-to-contract re-
quirement, which largely consists of its practical erosion. That ex-
perience suggests some of the drawbacks of an all-things-
considered test for the parties’ contractual intent. Part III con-
structs a general analytic framework for evaluating rules that con-
dition contractual validity on the parties’ intent with respect to le-
gal liability. Part IV applies that framework to four transaction 
types: gratuitous promises, preliminary agreements, agreements 
between spouses, and reporters’ confidentiality promises. The 
Conclusion suggests a few implications of the analysis for the best 
interpretation of the Restatement’s generic rule for intent to con-
tract. 
I. COMMON-LAW RULES ON INTENT TO CONTRACT 
Continental civil codes include among the conditions of contrac-
tual validity a requirement that, at the time of formation, the par-
ties intend to be legally bound. The Commission on European 
Contract Law restates the rule: “In order to be bound by a contract 
a party must have an intention to be legally bound.”15 In the Ger-
man and Austrian codes, one finds the condition in the definition 
of “contract” as a juristic act, achieved by a party’s declaration of 
her intent to be bound (Willenserklärung), which the law effectu-
ates because it is so intended.16 French law holds that a person is 
bound in contract only if it is her “real” intention to be bound, 
though a party who appears to have intended to contract but can 
15 The Commission of European Contract Law, Principles of European Contract 
Law art. 2:101 cmt. B (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000). See generally id. at arts. 
2:101, 2:102 and accompanying notes (discussing European sources of law). 
16 Id. at 139 n.2. 
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show that she did not might still be liable for damages in tort.17 Bel-
gian authorities are divided as to whether a real or apparent intent 
to be bound is required, but appear to agree that it must be one or 
the other.18
The black-letter rules of the common law are less unified. This 
Article’s primary focus is U.S. contract law, and so it begins with 
Section 21 of the Second Restatement, which I will refer to as the 
“Restatement rule”: “Neither real nor apparent intention that a 
promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a con-
tract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not af-
fect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”19 It is 
a familiar fact that the parties’ intent to contract does not suffice 
under the common law to create a contract. A lack of considera-
tion or of a required writing, for example, might each defeat the 
parties’ intent to enter into an enforceable agreement. The first 
clause of Section 21 says that the parties’ manifest intent to con-
tract is also not a necessary condition of enforcement.20
The second clause of Section 21 says that a manifest intent not to 
be bound can prevent the formation of a contract. On its face, then, 
the difference between the continental rules and the Restatement 
rule should make a difference only in the no-intent case. The rules 
agree that an agreement is enforceable where there is a manifest 
intent to be bound and that it is unenforceable when there is a 
manifest intent not to be bound. They differ on those cases in 
which one or both parties manifest no intent with respect to legal 
liability, neither an intent to be bound, nor an intent not to be 
bound. According to the continental rules, such agreements are not 
to be enforced; according to the Restatement rule, they are. Thus 
the comments to Section 21 explain that even a mutually mistaken 
17 Id. at 146 n.2(b). 
18 Id. at n.2(c). 
19 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 (1981). Or as one court observed in a rare 
judicial articulation of the rule: “It is not necessary that the parties are conscious of 
the legal relationship which their words or acts give rise to, but it is essential that the 
acts manifesting assent shall be done intentionally.” Sulzbach v. Town of Jefferson, 
155 N.W.2d 921, 923 (S.D. 1968). 
20 Section 2-313(2) of the U.C.C. similarly provides that it “is not necessary to the 
creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‘warrant’ or 
‘guarantee’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty.” 
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belief that an agreement is not legally binding will not prevent the 
creation of a contract: 
A orally promises to sell B a book in return for B’s promise to 
pay $5. A and B both think such promises are not binding unless 
in writing. Nevertheless there is a contract, unless one of them in-
tends not to be legally bound and the other knows or has reason 
to know of that intention.21
Or as Corbin suggests: 
There seems to be no serious doubt that a mutual agreement to 
trade a horse for a cow would be an enforceable contract, even 
though it is made by two ignorant persons who never heard of a 
legal relation and who do not know that society offers any kind 
of a remedy for the enforcement of such an agreement.22
Parties to an agreement might have no intent one way or the 
other with respect to enforcement because they have not consid-
ered the legal consequences of their agreement, because they are 
unsure whether they want enforcement, or because they mistak-
enly believe their agreement is unenforceable on other grounds. 
Alternatively, no matter what the parties’ actual intent, it might 
not be manifest in their behavior. The Restatement rule says that 
in all of these cases, if the parties’ agreement satisfies the other 
conditions of contractual validity, they have a contract. 
The origin of the Restatement rule is connected to the objective 
theory of contract. The earliest modern articulation of the rule ap-
pears in the first edition of Williston’s Law of Contracts.23 Pollack’s 
21 Restatement (Second) of Contracts  § 21, cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981). 
22 1 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 34, at 135 (1st ed. 1950). 
23 1 Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts § 21 (1st ed. 1920) [hereinafter Willis-
ton 1920 Edition]. Neither Williston’s treatise nor the First Restatement cites a clear 
judicial authority for the rule. The only case Williston cites that is remotely on point is 
Davison v. Holden, 10 A. 515 (Conn. 1887), cited in 1 Williston 1920 Edition § 21, at 
22 n.12. But Davison is more about corporations and agency law than contracts, hold-
ing that a group of individuals who had informally joined together to purchase whole-
sale meat were individually liable to the sellers for payment, despite not having in-
tended to be so liable. It is worth noting, however, that one of the cases Williston cites 
for the opt-out rule, Wellington v. Apthorp, elsewhere suggests that an intent to be 
bound is an element of legal liability. 13 N.E. 10, 13 (Mass. 1887), cited in 1 Williston 
1920 Edition § 21, at 23 n.15 (stating that a contract existed only if “it appears there 
was a promise by the defendant’s testator sufficiently definite to be enforced, and 
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and Anson’s earlier contract treatises had both adopted Savigny’s 
will theory of contract, which conditioned the formation of a con-
tract on an act of mental assent.24 Williston’s treatise introduces the 
rule in a passage that also rejects the subjective theory of contract.25 
And in both Williston’s early drafts of the First Restatement and in 
the final approved version, the rule appears alongside the objective 
theory of assent.26
While Williston’s campaign against the subjective theory is part 
of the history of the Restatement rule, the rule is not a mere corol-
lary of the newer objective approach. Section 21 rejects as a condi-
tion of contractual validity not only the parties’ “real . . . intention 
that a promise be legally binding,” but also their “apparent inten-
tion” to be bound. This objective prong of the Restatement rule 
must find its support elsewhere.27
made with the understanding and intention that she would be legally bound 
thereby”). 
24 Williston’s named target in the first edition is Pollock, whose 1911 treatise argued 
that social arrangements (for example, an appointment to have dinner) are not con-
tracts “[o]nly because no legal bond was intended by the parties.” Frederick Pollock, 
Principles of Contract: A Treatise on the General Principles Concerning the Validity 
of Agreements in the Law of England 4 n.c (8th ed. 1911). A similar rule appears in 
the 1906 edition of Anson’s English Law of Contract. William R. Anson, Principles of 
the English Law of Contract: And of Agency in Its Relation to Contract 2, 11 (11th 
ed. 1906). 
25 1 Williston 1920 Edition, supra note 23 § 21, at 21. Williston’s argument in § 21 of 
the first edition regularly lapses into arguments based on the objective theory, and 
even cites Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York, the source of Learned 
Hand’s famous “twenty bishops” pronouncement, for the proposition that “the law, 
not the parties, fixes the requirements of a legal obligation.” Id. at 22 n.13 (citing 
Hotchkiss v. Nat. City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911)); see also id. at 23 n.18 
(quoting objective theory expressed in Hoggard v. Dickerson, 165 S.W. 1135 (Mo. 
App. 1914)). 
26 Thus the First Restatement reads: 
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an informal contract is essen-
tial to its formation and the acts by which such assent is manifested must be 
done with the intent to do those acts; but . . . neither mental assent to the prom-
ises in the contract nor real or apparent intent that the promises shall be legally 
binding is essential. 
Restatement of Contracts § 20 (1932) (emphasis added). The text of this section is 
nearly identical to that of the earliest available of Williston’s tentative drafts. Re-
statement of Contracts § 20 (Tentative Draft, Mar. 31, 1925). 
27 Williston was hardly oblivious to such details. The first edition of his treatise con-
tains, in addition to the rejection of the subjective theory, at least three other argu-
ments for the Restatement rule: where such a rule is in place, “the intent is frequently 
fictitiously assumed”; an intent-to-contract requirement is not necessary to prevent 
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The logical gap between the Restatement rule and the objective 
theory is illustrated by the very different approach of the black-
letter law in England. One year before Williston published the first 
edition of his treatise, the King’s Bench decided Balfour v. Balfour, 
holding that a husband’s promise to his wife to pay her £30 per 
month while he was abroad, though supported by consideration, 
did not result in a contract “because the parties did not intend that 
[the agreement] should be attended by legal consequences.”28 Bal-
four’s reasoning and its handling of the facts have prompted a good 
deal of criticism. It is often argued, for example, that the promise 
was without consideration.29 Nonetheless, English courts and most 
English commentators have consistently read Balfour to require 
the opposite of the Restatement approach, which I will refer to as 
the “English rule”: “For a contract to come into existence, there 
must be . . . an intention to create legal relations.”30 Subsequent de-
cisions have held that the test is an objective one. As a recent edi-
tion of Anson explains, “[i]t may be that the promisor never antici-
pated that the promise would give rise to any legal obligation, but 
if a reasonable person would consider that there was an intention 
the enforcement of social or domestic arrangements; and intent-to-contract require-
ments run counter to the principles of the common law of contract, as embodied in 
the doctrine of consideration. 1 Williston 1920 Edition, supra note 23 § 21, at 22–24. I 
discuss the first of these arguments in Part II, the second in Section IV.C, and the 
third in the Conclusion. 
28 Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579. Williston discusses Balfour in the sec-
ond edition of his treatise. 1 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 
§ 21, at 38 n.14 (2d ed. 1936) [hereinafter Williston 1936 Edition]. 
29 See, e.g., B.A. Hepple, Intention to Create Legal Relations, 28 Camb. L.J. 122, 
128–29 (1970); Raphael Tuck, Intent to Contract and Mutuality of Assent, 21 Can. 
Bar Rev. 123, 124–25 (1943); J. Unger, Intent to Create Legal Relations, Mutuality 
and Consideration, 19 Mod. L. Rev. 96, 98 (1956). 
30 Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274, [59] 
(Eng.); see also 1 Chitty on Contracts 198 (H.G. Beale ed., 29th ed. 2004) (“[I]t has 
been held that an agreement, though supported by consideration, was not binding as a 
contract because it was made without any intention of creating legal relations.” (foot-
notes omitted)); J. Beatson, Anson’s Law of Contract 69 (28th ed. 2002) (“[I]t is now 
established that an agreement will not constitute a binding contract unless it is one 
which can reasonably be regarded as having been made in contemplation of legal con-
sequences.”); M.P. Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract 121 
(14th ed. 2001) (“[I]n addition to the phenomenon of agreement and the presence of 
consideration, a third contractual element is required—the intention of the parties to 
create legal relations.”); Guenter Treitel, The Law of Contract 149 (10th ed. 1999) 
(“An agreement, though supported by consideration, is not binding as a contract if it 
was made without any intention of creating legal relations.” (footnote omitted)). 
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so to contract, then the promisor will be bound.”31 Where the Re-
statement unequivocally states that a manifest intent to be bound is 
not necessary for contractual liability, English courts and treatises 
regularly say that it is. 
The Restatement and English rules are black-letter rules, and do 
not necessarily describe judicial practice. As I discuss in Part II, the 
English rule is something of a doctrinal fiction. While English au-
thorities continue to treat Balfour as good law, courts have 
adopted evidentiary rules that in the vast majority of cases render 
the rule practically irrelevant. In U.S. jurisdictions, on the contrary, 
courts rarely cite Section 21, but they largely follow it in practice. 
Thus, contract plaintiffs are almost never required to provide evi-
dence that the parties thought or appeared to think that they were 
entering into a legally binding agreement. 
There are, however, exceptions in U.S. law. A number of black-
letter rules stipulate or suggest that in some cases a court should 
look to the parties’ manifest intent. 
The most widely discussed of these is the rule for preliminary 
agreements. In a preliminary agreement, the parties have reached 
agreement on some but not all material terms, expect to continue 
negotiating, and fill in the remaining open terms, but something 
happens to prevent the conclusion of the agreement.32 The question 
is then whether the partial agreement has created any legal obliga-
tions.33 It is generally accepted that preliminary agreements should 
31 Beatson, supra note 30, at 71; see also Chitty on Contracts, supra note 30, at 200 
(“In deciding issues of contractual intention, the courts normally apply an objective 
test . . . . The objective test is, however, here (as elsewhere) subject to the limitation 
that it does not apply in favour of a party who knows the truth.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Treitel, supra note 30, at 158 (“The test of contractual intention is normally an objec-
tive one, so that where, for example, an agreement for the sale of a house is not ‘sub-
ject to contract,’ both parties are likely to be bound even though one of them subjec-
tively believed that he would not be bound till the usual exchange of contracts had 
taken place.” (footnotes omitted)). 
32 There is another type of preliminary agreement: when the parties have reached 
agreement on all the material terms they expect to put in the agreement, have fin-
ished negotiating, and are only awaiting a formal expression in writing. The test for 
enforceability of such agreements is similar to that for preliminary agreements with 
open terms. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 (1981). 
33 A separate question is what obligations an enforceable preliminary agreement 
imposes on the parties. While courts generally agree on when a preliminary agree-
ment should be enforced, they take different approaches to the parties’ obligations 
under them. Under one approach, the preliminary agreement is simply an incomplete 
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be enforced only when the parties manifestly so intended. In his in-
fluential 1987 decision in Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associa-
tion v. Tribune Co., Judge Leval described the rule as follows:
In seeking to determine whether such a preliminary commitment 
should be considered binding, a court’s task is, once again, to de-
termine the intentions of the parties at the time of their entry 
into the understanding, as well as their manifestations to one an-
other by which the understanding was reached. Courts must be 
particularly careful to avoid imposing liability where binding ob-
ligation was not intended. There is a strong presumption against 
finding binding obligation in agreements which include open 
terms, call for future approvals and expressly anticipate future 
preparation and execution of contract documents. Nonetheless, if 
that is what the parties intended, courts should not frustrate their 
achieving that objective or disappoint legitimately bargained 
contract expectations.34
That year Alan Farnsworth described the same rule: “Whether the 
parties reach an agreement with open terms, either preliminary or 
ultimate, depends on whether they intend to be bound even if they 
are unable to agree on the open terms.”35 Two years later, Judge 
Easterbrook applied the test in Empro Manufacturing Co. v. Ball-
contract. The court enforces the terms the parties have agreed upon and supplies 
missing ones with generic gap-fillers. The other approach reads the preliminary 
agreement as an agreement to negotiate. Rather than enforcing the partial agreement 
and filling in gaps, a court will find a breach only if one party walks away from or oth-
erwise improperly terminates negotiations. See Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 249–53. 
34 670 F. Supp. 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). With respect to the content of the agree-
ment, Teachers Insurance took the latter of the two approaches identified in the pre-
ceding footnote. Rather than filling in missing terms and enforcing the incomplete 
agreement, Leval concluded that the preliminary agreement created a duty to negoti-
ate open terms in good faith. Id. 
35 Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 253. Farnsworth distinguishes between how courts 
approach preliminary agreements with open terms and how they approach agree-
ments to negotiate. In the former, the salient question is more often the substance of 
the parties’ agreement, as opposed to whether they intended legal liability. Id. at 263–
69. 
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Co Manufacturing,36 and it continues to be the dominant approach 
in preliminary agreement cases.37
Similar rules appear elsewhere in U.S. law. The comments to 
Section 21 suggest that the parties’ contractual intent is a condition 
of the contractual validity of domestic agreements and social ar-
rangements: “In some situations the normal understanding is that 
no legal obligation arises, and some unusual manifestation of inten-
tion is necessary to create a contract. Traditional examples are so-
cial engagements and agreements within a family group.”38 An-
other example can be found in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., which held that a re-
porter’s promise of confidentiality to his source did not create a 
contract: 
We are not persuaded that in the special milieu of media news-
gathering a source and a reporter ordinarily believe they are en-
gaged in making a legally binding contract. They are not thinking 
in terms of offers and acceptances in any commercial or business 
sense. The parties understand that the reporter’s promise of ano-
nymity is given as a moral commitment, but a moral obligation 
alone will not support a contract.39
Finally there is the largely unsuccessful Model Written Obligations 
Act, today the law only in Pennsylvania, where the statute reads as 
follows: “A written release or promise, hereafter made and signed 
by the person releasing or promising, shall not be invalid or unen-
forceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an 
additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer 
intends to be legally bound.”40
36 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Parties may decide for themselves whether the 
results of preliminary negotiations bind them.”). 
37 See, e.g., Brown v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 156–58 (2d Cir. 2005); Trianco, LLC v. 
IBM Corp., 583 F.  Supp. 2d 649, 657–60 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 
A.2d 700, 710–11 (Md. 2007). 
38 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 cmt. c (1981). 
39 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
40 33 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Uniform Written 
Obligations Act § 1, in Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 584 (1925). I refer to the latter source as the 
“Model Written Obligations Act” throughout this Article, which has become common 
practice given most states’ failure to enact it. See James D. Gordon III, Consideration 
and the Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 283, 311 n.176 (1991). 
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Part IV discuses in greater detail each of the above exceptions to 
the Restatement rule. Another doctrinal example that bears men-
tion, but which I will not examine in detail, can be found in the 
rules for incomplete or indefinite agreements. The idea appears in 
Cardozo’s 1916 dissent in Varney v. Ditmars: 
I do not think it is true that a promise to pay an [employee] a fair 
share of the profits in addition to his salary is always and of ne-
cessity too vague to be enforced. . . . The promise must, of 
course, appear to have been made with contractual intent. . . . 
But if that intent is present, it cannot be said from the mere form 
of the promise that the estimate of the reward is inherently im-
possible.41
Had the seeds in Cardozo’s dissent grown into a full-fledged doc-
trine, courts might have viewed the rule for preliminary agree-
ments as a special application of the rule for incomplete or indefi-
nite ones. As it is, the idea never took root, and it appears in U.S. 
law as more of a suggestion than a rule. Thus, Section 33 of the 
Second Restatement provides that “[t]he fact that one or more 
terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show 
that a manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood 
as an offer or as an acceptance,” and the comments explain that 
where “the actions of the parties . . . show conclusively that they 
have intended to conclude a binding agreement, . . . courts en-
deavor, if possible, to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the 
bargain.”42 One finds similar gestures towards an intent-to-contract 
test in the U.C.C.’s rules for incomplete agreements. Section 2-
204(3) reads: “Even though one or more terms are left open a con-
tract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have in-
tended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis 
for giving an appropriate remedy.”43 And Section 2-305 confirms 
41 111 N.E. 822, 826 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
42 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(3) & cmt. a (1981); see also id. § 33 cmts. 
c (“The more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended 
to conclude a binding agreement.”) & f (“The more important the uncertainty, the 
stronger the indication is that the parties do not intend to be bound.”). 
43 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1968). While the 2003 proposed amendments to Article 2 
would change some of the language of §§ 2-204(3) and 2-305(1), they would not 
change the substance of those provisions. As of the publication of this Article, no 
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that the same rule applies to the special case of agreements missing 
a price term: “The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract 
for sale even though the price is not settled.”44
The meanings of these provisions, however, are far from trans-
parent. Thus it is not clear that intent “to conclude a binding 
agreement” in the comment to Section 33 means the intent to con-
clude a legally binding agreement. Similarly, the UCC’s intent “to 
make a contract” might be read to mean an intent to conclude an 
agreement, not that one be legally bound to it. In 1990, a National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws study group 
recommended substituting “intended to conclude a bargain” in 
Section 2-204(3) for “intended to make a contract” on the grounds 
that “[i]t is unlikely that the latter intention is present in most cases 
and doubtful that it should be required.”45 That change, however, 
did not make it into the first Council Draft,46 and the group’s other 
proposed revisions to Article 2 were eventually withdrawn for 
other reasons.47 While a few courts have followed Cardozo’s lead 
and read Sections 2-204(3) and 2-305 to condition enforcement on 
the parties’ intent to contract,48 many more apply the rules without 
states have adopted the 2003 amendments. See http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ 
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucc22A03.asp (last visited May 26, 2009). 
44 U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1968). There is an argument that 2-305 as drafted has a prob-
lem with the neglected middle. While the first subsection suggests that an agreement 
with an open price term is binding only if the parties so intended, the fourth stipulates 
that where “the parties intend not to be bound unless the price is fixed or agreed and 
it is not fixed or agreed, there is no contract.” U.C.C.  § 2-305(4) (1968). The rule does 
not say what the outcome is where the parties manifest no intent one way or another. 
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 cmt. e (1981) (describing the U.C.C. rule 
in terms of only two cases: where the parties “intend to conclude a contract” and 
where they “manifest an intention not to be bound”).
45 PEB Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, at 63 (Preliminary Re-
port, Mar. 1, 1990).  
46 U.C.C. Revised Art. 2 Sales § 2-203(b) (Council Draft No. 1, Nov. 9, 1995) (“If the 
parties so intend, an agreement is sufficient to make a contract even if . . . one or 
more terms are left open or to be agreed upon.”). 
47 Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never End-
ing Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. Rev. 1683 (1999); Richard E. Speidel, 
Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607 (2001). 
48 See, e.g., Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(stating that the test for incomplete contracts is whether “the parties themselves 
meant to make a ‘contract’ and to bind themselves to render a future performance”); 
Schade v. Diethrich, 760 P.2d 1050, 1059 (Ariz. 1988) (finding that by their actions, 
“the parties clearly manifested their joint understanding that they were bound by 
their promises”). 
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a separate inquiry into the parties’ contractual intent.49 And it is 
difficult to find any cases in which the parties’ intent makes a dif-
ference in the outcome—in which the court holds that incomplete 
terms are “reasonably certain,” but then refuses enforcement be-
cause the parties did not intend to be legally bound.50 Though the 
gestures towards an intent-to-contract test for incomplete and in-
definite agreements suggest the justificatory role such intent might 
play, without more evidence it cannot be said to be the law. 
II. VERIFYING CONTRACTUAL INTENT UNDER THE ENGLISH RULE 
It is one thing to say that the existence of a contract should 
sometimes depend on the parties’ manifest intent to be legally 
bound; it is another to say how courts charged with the enforce-
49 See, e.g., Lush v. Terri & Ruth, 324 F. Supp. 2d 90, 92–94 (D. Maine 2004) (infer-
ring parties’ lack of intent from the absence of key terms in the contract); Price v. 
Grimes, 677 P.2d 969, 974–75 (Kan. 1984) (finding “sufficient evidence” of a contract 
in the parties’ actions); Grayson v. La Branche, 225 A.2d 922, 923 (N.H. 1967) (same); 
Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. v. Henry & Warren Corp., 548 N.E.2d 203, 206 (N.Y. 
1989) (concluding that “the price term was sufficiently definite for an enforceable 
contract”); Nilavar v. Osborn, 738 N.E.2d 1271, 1284 (Ohio App. 2000) (quoting Sec-
ond Restatement, but discussing no evidence of intent); McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & 
Haiman Co. v. First Union Mgt., Inc., 622 N.E.2d 1093, 1097–98 (Ohio App. 1993) 
(holding that “[a] contract is binding and enforceable if it encompasses the essential 
terms of the agreement”). 
50 Terms are reasonably certain “if they provide a basis for determining the exis-
tence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.” Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 33(2) (1981). I know of no systematic study of judicial application of this 
rule. But an examination of the first 50 cases generated by “Keyciting” § 33 and listed 
under the “Citing Cases” heading revealed no cases in which the outcome turned on 
the parties’ intent with respect to legal enforcement. Out of the 50 cases examined, 27 
held the agreement unenforceable. Of those 27, 16 did not mention the parties’ intent 
at all. See, e.g., Jessen Elec. & Serv. Co. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., Nos. 95-56175, 95-
56176, 1997 WL 30328, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1997) (finding insufficient definiteness 
for enforcement without discussing the parties’ intent). Of the remaining 11 decisions, 
none examined the parties’ intent to be legally bound, as distinguished from their in-
tent to finalize the agreement, and many separately found that the reasonable cer-
tainty requirement was not satisfied. See, e.g., Spurling v. The Forestland Group, 
LLC, 187 F. App’x 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that there was no current in-
tent to recognize parties as an agent without further negotiations); Pae Young Chung 
v. Byong Jik Choi, No. 07-2187, 2008 WL 3852237, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2008) 
(finding “that defendants did not manifest an intent to enter into a bargain on the 
terms proposed in plaintiffs’ offer”); SDK Invs., Inc. v. Ott, No. CIV. A. 94-1111, 1996 
WL 69402, at * 7–12 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996) (finding that whether or not parties in-
tended to be bound, terms were so uncertain as to be unenforceable). 
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ment of contracts should determine when the parties manifested 
such an intent. Part III provides a systematic analysis of different 
verification procedures. This Part describes the English experience 
with one method: a factual, all-things-considered inquiry into the 
parties’ manifest intent. The deficiencies of this approach cast new 
light on the alternative to the Restatement rule and provide mate-
rials for the discussion of other design options in Parts III and IV. 
The first edition of Williston’s treatise advanced several argu-
ments for what would become the Restatement rule. Among other 
things, Williston suggested that it “may be guessed that where it is 
stated that an intent to create a legal relation is the test of a con-
tract, the intent is frequently fictitiously assumed.”51 Ninety years 
of experience with the English rule have borne this prediction out. 
That experience shows that in the absence of legal formalities, the 
parties’ manifest intent with respect to legal liability is often un-
verifiable, and therefore unsuitable as a condition of contractual 
validity. English courts have responded to that fact with eviden-
tiary presumptions that have, for practical purposes, all but sus-
pended the English rule’s supposed intent-to-contract requirement 
in commercial cases. 
The English rule says that a contract exists only when the parties 
manifest an intent to be legally bound, that is, when a reasonable 
person in the parties’ circumstances would have understood them 
to have such an intent. The parties’ manifest intent is a question of 
fact, to be answered by looking at the totality of the circumstances. 
These circumstances can include the type of agreement, the com-
pleteness and specificity of the terms, the nature of the parties’ re-
lationship, as well as more general consideration of the parties’ rea-
sonable background beliefs.52 When factfinders fully engage in this 
inquiry, however, the results can be difficult to predict. 
Consider Guenter Treitel’s analysis of J. Evans & Sons (Ports-
mouth) v. Andrea Merzario, in which the Court of Appeal consid-
ered a carrier’s telephone assurance to a long-term customer that 
the customer’s goods would thenceforth be carried in containers 
under deck.53 The trial court held, based on the existence of a writ-
51 1 Williston 1920 Edition, supra note 23 § 21, at 22–23. 
52 See Treitel, supra note 30, at 151–59. 
53 [1975] Lloyd’s Rep. 162, rev’d, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1078, 40 M.L.R. 227; see also Tre-
itel, supra note 30, at 159. 
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ten sales agreement and the fact that the carrier’s oral assurances 
did not relate to a particular transaction, that the conversation did 
not evince a contractual intent.54 The Court of Appeal reversed, 
observing that the defendant made the promise “in order to induce 
[the plaintiff] to agree to the goods being carried in containers.”55 
Treitel argues that the trial court’s decision was the better one, 
since the plaintiff’s subjective understanding should have been ir-
relevant to the court’s analysis.56 But the appellate opinions rely en-
tirely on objective evidence—available to both parties at the time 
of the agreement—that the promise was meant as an inducement. 
Based on the evidence discussed in the opinions, it is impossible to 
say what the parties’ intent was. 
Stephen Hedley has examined a large number of cases applying 
the English rule and concludes that “the tests ostensibly aimed at 
discovering the parties’ intentions almost invariably lead the courts 
to impose their view of a fair solution to the dispute.”57 Hedley 
identifies several techniques courts use to reach their preferred 
outcome. The first turns on the fact that the English rule does not 
expressly provide for the no manifest intent case. Hedley observes 
that “[i]n cases where there was no intention either way, this insis-
tence that the parties must have had some intention or other forces 
the courts to invent an intention.”58 Courts can also manipulate out-
comes through evidentiary rulings. As J. Evans & Sons demon-
strates, courts can allow or disallow evidence by adopting a 
broader or narrower interpretation of what counts as the parties’ 
“objective” intent. They can permit the factfinder to make assump-
tions about the parties’ background understandings or awareness 
of the availability or unavailability of legal sanctions. And courts 
sometimes read the intent question narrowly, asking only whether 
the parties foresaw a lawsuit, as distinguished from whether they 
believed themselves to be entering into a contract.59 Finally, Hedley 
54 [1975] Lloyd’s Rep. at 167–68. Reading the decision, it appears that a U.S. court 
would have more likely applied the parol evidence rule to the case. 
55 [1976] W.L.R. at 1081 (Denning, M.R.); see also id. at 1083 (Roskill, L.J.) (em-
ploying similar reasoning). 
56 Treitel, supra note 30, at 159. 
57 Stephen Hedley, Keeping Contract in Its Place—Balfour v. Balfour and the En-
forceability of Informal Agreements, 5 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 391, 393 (1985). 
58 Id. at 394.  
59 Id. at 395–96. 
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points to the “selectively morbid imaginations” of lawyers, who 
mistakenly infer from their professional knowledge of past litiga-
tion that similar liability was within the contemplation of the par-
ties.60 In sum, in cases where the question of the parties’ contractual 
intent gets to the factfinder, the outcome of that factual inquiry is 
often unpredictable and especially subject to judicial manipulation. 
There are at least three reasons why it is in many cases difficult 
to verify the parties’ manifest intent with respect to legal liability 
using the English rule’s all-things-considered approach. The first 
concerns the sort of intention at issue. The parties’ contractual in-
tent is not an intention to do some act in the future (such as to per-
form one’s promise), but an intention that their present actions 
shall have a certain legal effect. In other words, the parties’ intent 
to contract is comprised of their reasons for and beliefs about their 
present actions, as distinguished from their plans to act in the fu-
ture. Evidence of future-oriented intentions can often be found in 
the agent’s subsequent acts, including steps taken or not taken to-
wards realizing that intention.61 That form of evidence is not avail-
able when it comes to interpreting a person’s present intentions in 
action. Unless the agent tells us her purposes and beliefs, we must 
infer them from the totality of what we know about her practical 
attitudes and epistemic situation. In some cases this is easy. If a 
person flips off a light switch, she probably intends to turn off the 
lights. But as the connection between act and consequence be-
comes more attenuated, we must know more about the actor and 
the surrounding circumstances to interpret her present intent. We 
need to know much more about the switch-flipper to ascribe her an 
intent to save electricity, and even more to ascribe her an intent to 
do her part to avoid global warming. Where the parties’ agreement 
does not include obvious markers of contractual intent, such as le-
gal formalities, terms that presuppose enforcement, or an express 
statement of intent, we can attribute them an intent to contract 
only on the basis of a great many other assumptions about the mo-
tives and knowledge with which they act, assumptions that are of-
ten contestable. 
60 Id. at 397. 
61 See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented 
Intent 119–26 (2005). 
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Second, there is an issue of salience. Stuart Macaulay observes 
that legal liability often plays a secondary role in transactions be-
tween business people.62 Many parties enter into an agreement on 
the basis of personal trust, or because there exist extralegal sanc-
tions or other incentives that suggest performance will happen. 
This is not to say that they do not also know that they are entering 
into a contract. But the legal consequences of their agreement 
might not be especially salient. If an awareness of legal liability ex-
ists, it is better characterized as a background belief, as opposed to 
an occurrent thought. While such background beliefs may well sat-
isfy the intent-to-contract test, they are much harder to verify. As 
Randy Barnett indicates in a somewhat different context, a per-
son’s tacit assumptions “are notoriously difficult to prove di-
rectly—even the person possessing this sort of knowledge may be 
unaware of it.”63
A final source of indeterminacy lies in the objective theory itself. 
The use of “objective” in “objective intent” refers not to scientific 
verifiability—as in, “the rate of acceleration due to gravity is an ob-
jective fact”—but to the possible gap between a person’s actual, or 
“subjective,” intent and her manifest or publicly observable intent. 
A party’s objective intent is, roughly speaking, the intent a reason-
able person in the parties’ shared epistemic situation would attrib-
ute to her. This is an interpretive fact, as distinguished from a sci-
entifically verifiable one. The factfinder must project herself into 
the parties’ position, balancing her own sense of what is reasonable 
against what she knows about the norms, understandings, and as-
sumptions of the parties in the context of the transaction. Because 
there are no fixed rules for deciding either what the parties’ epis-
temic and normative situation was or how to balance it against the 
factfinder’s own sense of what is reasonable, such judgments are 
inherently contestable. 
The point of these observations is not that the parties’ manifest 
intent with respect to legal liability is inaccessible. In many cases it 
62 Stuart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 60 (1963); see also Hedley, supra note 57, at 396; Mary Keyes & 
Kylie Burns, Contract and the Family: Whither Intention?, 26 Melb. U. L. Rev. 577, 
585–87 (2002). 
63 Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 9, at 880. The statement occurs in Barnett’s 
analysis of contract gap-filling rules, as opposed to rules governing formation. 
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is entirely verifiable. This is most obviously so when the parties say 
what they intend by using words like “This is a legally enforceable 
agreement,” or “This is not a legally enforceable agreement,” or by 
employing a legal formality like the seal. The parties’ contractual 
intent is also unequivocally manifest when their agreement in-
cludes terms that presuppose enforcement, such as a liquidated 
damages or choice of law clause. In yet other cases, the parties’ 
past behavior (a suit on an earlier, similar agreement) or their rela-
tionship with one another (the use of lawyers, the natural expecta-
tions about an invitation to dinner) might make their intent with 
respect to legal liability clear. But between transactions in which 
the parties clearly intend legal liability and those in which they 
clearly do not lies a wide band of gray. Experience with literal ap-
plications of the English rule has shown that the evidence of the 
parties’ intent is in a significant number of cases equivocal at best; 
that courts exercise broad discretion in evaluating its relevance and 
weight; and that the outcomes of such all-things-considered judg-
ments can be difficult to predict. In short, for many agreements the 
parties’ intent with respect to contractual liability at the time of 
formation cannot be verified at the time of litigation. 
Because of the unpredictability of the all-things-considered test 
for contractual intent, English courts have adopted evidentiary 
rules that effectively preclude litigation of the issue in the vast ma-
jority of commercial cases, which constitute the vast majority of 
contract cases. The most important is the presumption that parties 
to a commercial agreement that satisfies the other elements of a 
contract intended to be legally bound.64 Thus, in Edwards v. Sky-
ways Ltd., which considered an employer’s promise of an “ex gra-
tia payment” to a dismissed employee, the court reasoned: 
64 See Atiyah, supra note 8, at 154 (“[T]here is a strong presumption that business or 
commercial dealings are intended to have legal effect.”); Cheshire, Fifoot and Furm-
ston, supra note 30, at 126 (“In commercial agreements it will be presumed that the 
parties intended to create legal relations and make a contract.”); Chitty on Contracts, 
supra note 30, at 199 (“In the case of ordinary commercial transactions it is not nor-
mally necessary to prove that the parties to an express agreement in fact intended to 
create legal relations.”); Treitel, supra note 30, at 157 (“But where a claim is based on 
a proved or admitted express agreement the courts do not require, in addition, proof 
that parties to an ordinary commercial relationship actually intended to be bound.”). 
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In the present case, the subject-matter of the agreement is busi-
ness relations, not social or domestic matters. There was a meet-
ing of minds—an intention to agree. There was, admittedly, con-
sideration for the company’s promise. I accept the propositions 
of counsel for the plaintiff that in a case of this nature the onus is 
on the party who asserts that no legal effect was intended, and 
the onus is a heavy one.65
In commercial cases the defendant bears the burden of proving 
that the parties did not intend legal liability—as under the Re-
statement rule the defendant must demonstrate a manifest intent 
not to contract. English courts have raised the bar even higher by 
reading ambiguous expressions of intent against the defendant. 
Thus in Edwards, the court found that the term “ex gratia” did not 
indicate an intent to be free of legal liability. Other courts have 
found contractual intent despite stipulations that the agreement 
was “fixed in good faith”66 or that it was to be “interpreted as an 
honourable engagement,”67 and where letters discussing settlement 
terms included the words “without prejudice.”68 Finally, English 
courts have held that one-sided or partial performance of the 
agreement negates even an unambiguous statement that it is not 
intended as a contract.69
The net effect of these evidentiary rules is that in most commer-
cial cases, the English rule produces the same outcome as the Re-
statement rule would. More to the point, in the vast majority of 
commercial contract cases, there is no point to litigating the ques-
tion of contractual intent. Hedley concludes, “Where the parties 
are dealing at arms’ length, the rule is simple: there is no require-
65 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 349, 355 (Q.B.). 
66 The Mercedes Envoy [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 559, 562 (W.B.). 
67  Home and Overseas Ins. Co. v. Mentor Ins. Co. (UK) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 473 
(Q.B.); Home Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 674, 
676 (Q.B.). 
68 Tomlin v. Standard Teles. & Cables Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1378, 1382; see also 
Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, supra note 30, at 27–30; Treitel, supra note 30, at 150–
51. An exception is the phrase “subject to contract” in agreements for the sale of real 
estate. This phrase has taken on a conventional meaning in such transactions, and 
English courts interpret it to negative contractual intent. See Atiyah, supra note 8, at 
159–62. 
69 See Atiyah, supra note 8, at 154–55 (describing cases). 
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ment of intention to create legal relations.”70 P.S. Atiyah, quoting 
Williston, makes the same point: “It is . . . more realistic to say that 
no positive intention to enter into legal relations needs to be 
shown, and that ‘a deliberate promise seriously made is enforced 
irrespective of the promisor’s views regarding his legal liability.’”71
The practical erosion of the English rule makes perfect sense. 
Contracts create legal rights and duties. The conditions of contrac-
tual validity function not only to assign responsibility for wrongs 
after the fact, but also to inform people of their rights and duties ex 
ante. This guidance function, which is perhaps especially important 
in commercial transactions, requires that parties be able to know 
when they have entered into a contract. It therefore requires a de-
gree of certainty and predictability as to whether a given transac-
tion has satisfied the conditions of contractual validity. Absent a 
strong presumption one way or the other, the English rule’s all-
things-considered manifest intent test does not provide that cer-
tainty. 
There is a sense, then, in which what I have been calling “the 
English rule” is not the rule at all, but something like a doctrinal 
fiction, a story that some courts and commentators tell themselves 
about contract law. Despite the striking differences between the 
U.S. and English black-letter rules on contractual intent, courts 
have applied them in ways that largely converge in their results, 
evidence perhaps that if the common law does not always work it-
self pure, it can work itself practical. 
That said, I do not want to dismiss the English rule as a will-o’-
the-wisp. An all-things-considered inquiry into the parties’ mani-
fest intent is one way to design a legal test for the parties’ intent to 
contract. And while it may be a bad design for most contract cases, 
it can be appropriate for certain types of agreement. Or so I will 
argue in the next two Parts. 
III. INTENT AND INTERPRETATION 
The previous Part has described the trouble with the English 
rule as a verification problem: In too many cases, an ex post, all-
70 Hedley, supra note 57, at 412. 
71 Atiyah, supra note 8, at 153 (quoting 1 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law 
of Contracts 39 (3d ed. 1957)). 
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things-considered inquiry into the parties’ manifest intent with re-
spect to legal liability does not yield predictable results. Because 
the parties’ manifest intent is often nonexistent or not verifiable, 
their intent to contract is ill-suited as a condition of contractual va-
lidity. 
Given that the legal question is the parties’ manifest intent, the 
problem is one not only of verification, but also of interpretation. 
To identify the parties’ manifest contractual intent is to interpret 
the meaning of their words and actions. Restating the problem as 
an interpretive one has the advantage of locating it within a well-
developed theoretical framework. The design of rules for contract 
interpretation has received a good deal of attention in the twenty 
years since Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner published their article 
on penalty defaults.72 In the Ayres-Gertner framework, the differ-
ence between the English rule and the Restatement rule looks to 
be a difference in interpretive defaults. The discussion in the previ-
ous Part has shown, however, that the problem with the English 
rule lies not in the default but, again in Ayres and Gertner’s lan-
guage, in its rule for opting out of that default. This suggests a 
more complex account of the available options for including the 
parties’ intent with respect to contractual liability among the condi-
tions of contractual validity. 
A. Interpretive Defaults and Opt-out Rules 
The interpretation of contracts is different from the interpreta-
tion of literature or of dreams. Interpretive rules cast a long, dark 
shadow over many contractual transactions. For this reason, we can 
expect legal rules for interpreting contracts to influence many par-
ties’ behavior—the very behavior that is the object of those rules. 
One of Ayres and Gertner’s innovations was to take this fact seri-
ously and more systematically investigate the incentives legal in-
terpretive rules create. A second difference between the interpre-
tation of contracts and the interpretation of other sorts of texts 
follows from the fact that such legal interpretive rules function to 
assign rights and obligations. If Thomas Pynchon does not tell us 
the color of Pirate Prentice’s hair, we might reasonably conclude 
that there is no fact of the matter or that it is up to each reader to 
72 Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 13. 
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decide for herself. When interpretation is used to determine legal 
rights and obligations, on the contrary, there needs to be a predict-
able, correct answer for cases in which the law’s authors manifest 
no intent one way or the other. Legal interpretive rules of this sort 
must assign meaning both to expressive acts and to expressive 
omissions. This fact underlies Ayres and Gertner’s observation that 
nonmandatory legal interpretive rules have two component parts. 
The first is an interpretive default, which stipulates an act’s legal 
effect absent evidence of the actor’s contrary intent—when there is 
an expressive omission. The second is an opt-out rule, which stipu-
lates what evidence of a contrary intent suffices for a non-default 
interpretation—determining what counts as an expressive act and 
with what meaning. Each component of the interpretive rule can 
create incentives for parties to disclose or withhold information in 
one form or another. Another of Ayres and Gertner’s innovations 
was to think more systematically about the value of those incen-
tives, as well as the other secondary effects of interpretive rules. 
The most commonly discussed piece of the Ayres-Gertner 
framework is their analysis of interpretive defaults, and their ar-
guments for sometimes adopting nonmajoritarian defaults—default 
interpretations that are not the term that most parties would 
choose. Majoritarian defaults can have several advantages. They 
reduce drafting costs, since most parties do not need to add addi-
tional words to get the terms they want. They reduce verification 
costs, since in a greater number of cases the absence of evidence of 
a contrary intent decides the issue. And they can increase accuracy, 
for in the majority of cases where the default corresponds to the 
parties’ preferences courts are more likely to arrive at that inter-
pretation. But as Ayres and Gertner point out, in some instances 
we want one or both parties to undertake the costs of revealing in-
formation, either to each other or to a court that might be called 
upon to enforce their agreement. Thus the idea of “penalty” de-
faults. By adopting an interpretive default that runs against the 
preferences of one or both parties, the law can give parties an in-
centive to opt out of the default in a way that generates value-
creating information. 
The less-often discussed side of the Ayres-Gertner framework is 
their analysis of opt-out rules. A legal interpretive rule must spec-
ify not only a default, but also what suffices as evidence of legal ac-
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tors’ non-default intent. That is, it must also include a rule for opt-
ing out of the default. An opt-out rule can require from the parties 
more or less evidence that they intend a non-default term. To take 
a simple example from Ayres and Gertner, many U.C.C. rules pro-
vide that the legal default applies “unless otherwise agreed.”73 Sec-
tion 2-206, however, stipulates that an offer invites acceptance in 
any reasonable manner “[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indi-
cated.”74 Section 2-206 requires more of offerors who want to con-
tract around the default acceptance rules than do many other 
U.C.C. opt-out rules. Like the design of defaults, the design of opt-
out rules provides an opportunity to engineer incentives to disclose 
or withhold information. Different forms of opting out are more or 
less effective as means of sharing information, whether with the 
other party or with a future adjudicator. 
These two components of legal interpretive rules—interpretive 
default and opt-out—are related to one another. The best opt-out 
rule depends on what the default is, while the best default depends 
on the costs and benefits of the available opt-out rules. 
For the purposes of the following analysis, it will be helpful to 
distinguish three categories of costs that a default and opt-out rule 
might impose. The first is the cost to parties with non-default pref-
erences of creating the evidence required by the opt-out rule. Thus, 
Section 2-206 requires that offerors who wish to limit the modes of 
acceptance bear the extra cost of unambiguously stating their in-
tent. Second are the costs to the court of determining whether that 
evidentiary standard has been satisfied. While Section 2-206’s “un-
ambiguously intended” standard imposes greater costs on offerors, 
it should reduce costs to the courts, since it frees them from the 
task of resolving ambiguities. Third are error costs. One category 
of error costs comes from parties’ failure to opt out when they 
should have done so, or their choice to opt out when in fact the de-
fault corresponds to their preferences. Another sort of error occurs 
when a court fails to recognize that the parties opted out of the de-
fault, or wrongly concludes that the parties opted out when they in 
fact have not. 
73 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-303 (1968). 
74 Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 13, at 120 (discussing U.C.C. §§ 2-303 
& 2-206).  
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In comparing the relative desirability of interpretive rules, one 
consideration is the extent to which they impose the above sorts of 
costs. But that is not the only consideration. Another way of put-
ting Ayres and Gertner’s thesis about the occasional value of pen-
alty defaults is that in some cases otherwise costly opt-out rules 
also bring benefits. Their 1989 article emphasized the benefits from 
the disclosure of information by one party to the other, or by both 
parties to a neutral decisionmaker.75 Opt-out rules that require one 
or both parties to speak where they might otherwise remain silent 
are more costly to the speaker or speakers, but can force value-
creating information transfers. A second possible benefit comes 
from what might otherwise be considered party error costs.76 
Adopting an opt-out that is especially costly to the parties makes 
the default stickier: fewer parties who would otherwise choose 
non-default terms are willing to pay the costs of opting out. This is 
a cost to the parties with respect to getting the agreement they 
want. But if we want to encourage the parties to adopt one term 
over another with limited regard for their preferences, expensive 
opt-outs serve a positive channeling function. By making the so-
cially preferred default stickier, an interpretive rule can cause more 
parties to adopt it. 
This framework can be applied to identify different rules courts 
might use to determine the parties’ intent to contract. One problem 
with the English rule is that it imposes a minoritarian default for 
commercial agreements. Read literally, the rule would impose in 
many commercial agreements unacceptably high verification and 
error costs. English courts have addressed this defect with eviden-
tiary presumptions that effectively flip the default for commercial 
agreements—bringing application of the English rule in line with 
the text of the Restatement rule. That is, they have adopted a ma-
joritarian default, thereby avoiding in most cases the costs of veri-
fying the parties’ manifest intent. 
75 Id.; see also Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian, supra note 13, at 
1593–94. 
76 Ayres and Gertner discuss this potential benefit in Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian 
vs. Minoritarian, supra note 13, at 1598–1600; see also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hi-
erarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 
1738–53, 1755–58 (1997). 
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If this reading is correct, the exceptions to the Restatement rule 
described in Part I might be understood as more tailored alterna-
tives to its generic rule for commercial agreements. On this theory, 
most parties to preliminary agreements, domestic agreements, so-
cial arrangements and reporters’ confidentiality promises do not 
intend their agreement to be legally binding. The majoritarian de-
fault for such agreements is therefore something more akin to the 
English rule: no contract unless the parties manifest an intent to be 
bound. 
While there is something to this default-based reading, it ne-
glects the other component of legal interpretive rules: the interpre-
tive opt-out. The discussion in Part II has shown that the problem 
with the English rule is not so much its nonenforcement default, as 
its rule for determining when parties intended something other 
than the default—the all-things-considered inquiry into the parties’ 
manifest intent. While in theory the English rule’s manifest intent 
opt-out should impose on parties few out-of-pocket costs, since it 
does not require them to say or do anything special, it imposes sig-
nificant verification costs on the legal system when the parties’ in-
tent is actually litigated. More importantly, absent strong eviden-
tiary presumptions, the all-things-considered manifest intent opt-
out involves significant error costs, creating uncertainty ex ante 
about when a contract exists. 
If the problem with the English rule’s manifest-intent opt-out is 
one of verification, an obvious solution is to require that parties 
who want enforcement express that preference more clearly, pro-
ducing unequivocal evidence of it for courts. An example is the old 
writ of covenant’s seal requirement. Like the English rule, the writ 
of covenant set the default at no legal enforcement. Unlike the 
English rule, it required those who wanted enforcement to express 
that preference in a formal act: putting their agreement in writing 
and affixing a seal to it.77 But conventional legal forms are only one 
77 See A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the 
Action of Assumpsit 22–25 (1987) (describing the specialty requirement for the writ 
of covenant). In fact, the historical seal requirement was considerably more compli-
cated than is conveyed here, since exceptions were often made and enforcement 
might be had under other writs. My point is not about the historical function of the 
seal, but about its possible uses. 
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type of express opt-out.78 The rule might not demand any magic 
words or symbols, but only an express statement of intent. Thus, 
the Model Written Obligations Act requires only a writing that 
“contains an additional express statement, in any form of language, 
that the signer intends to be legally bound.”79
The availability of an express opt-out does not depend on what 
the default is. The text of Section 21 suggests an all-things-
considered test for the parties’ intent not to contract, for it speaks 
of “a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not effect legal 
relations.”80 In practice, however, U.S. courts refuse enforcement in 
run-of-the-mill commercial cases only when an agreement includes 
a TINALEA (“This is not a legally enforceable agreement”) 
clause, expressly stating the parties’ intent not to be bound.81 That 
78 Further elaboration on this point can be found in Klass, supra note 14, at 1744–47. 
79 Uniform Written Obligations Act § 1, supra note 40, at 584. 
80 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 (1981). 
81 The comments to § 21 appear to assume that the “manifestation of intention that 
a promise shall not affect legal relations” will appear as a “term” in the agreement. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 cmt. b (1981). A search of decisions in the 
past sixty years revealed no arms’ length commercial transactions in which a court de-
clined to enforce an agreement based on a finding of no intent to contract absent ex-
press language in the agreement to that effect. In Hamilton v. Boyce, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s finding, based on parol evidence, that an 
agreement between two sisters and one’s husband “was drawn up and signed by the 
parties not for the purpose of creating a partnership among themselves, but merely 
for the purpose giving plaintiff legal authority to operate the rest home while defen-
dants were away on a proposed extended trip.” 48 N.W.2d 172, 173 (Minn. 1951). And 
in Russell v. District of Columbia, the court held that a statement in a speech by D.C. 
Mayor Marion Barry “was in the nature of a campaign promise, which would not have 
been interpreted by most listeners as creating a legally binding contract.” 747 F. Supp. 
72, 80 (D.D.C. 1990). But decisions treating common forms of arms’ length commer-
cial agreements require a TINALEA clause of one type or another. See, e.g., Burbach 
Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding 
words “letter of intent” imply intent not to contract); Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul 
Corp., 578 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding words “this letter is not 
intended to create . . . any binding legal obligation” created safe harbor against en-
forcement); Hirschkorn v. Severson, 319 N.W.2d 475, 478 (N.D. 1982) (finding “gen-
tlemen’s agreement” referred to unenforceable agreement); Fed. Express Corp. v. 
Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) (holding disclaimer in employee hand-
book negated contract liability). See generally Effectiveness of Employer’s Dis-
claimer of Representations in Personnel Manual or Employee Handbook Altering 
At-Will Employment Relationship, 17 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1994). 
KLASS_BOOK 9/17/2009 5:26 PM 
2009] Intent to Contract 1467 
 
is, courts following the Restatement rule adopt an enforcement de-
fault together with an express opt-out rule.82
These observations suggest two different solutions to the prob-
lem with the English rule. One solution—the one adopted by Eng-
lish courts and by the text of Section 21 of the Second Restate-
ment—is to flip the interpretive default to a majoritarian one and 
establish a high evidentiary bar, so that the parties’ manifest intent 
will rarely be litigated. Another is to adopt an express opt-out rule, 
which gives courts better information about the parties’ intent. Or 
the law might do both. We can therefore distinguish four possible 
approaches to identifying the parties’ contractual intent, depending 
on the default and opt-out rules: 
82 This is not to say that an express opt-out will always suffice to avoid legal liability 
under U.S. law. Wendell Holmes reports that “[a]n analysis of [the] cases suggests 
that, contrary to traditional dogma, [TINALEA] clauses are not regularly enforced by 
courts on any systematic basis.” Wendell H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract, 
60 Tul. L. Rev. 751, 755 (1986). I observed in Part II that English Courts often treat 
TINALEA clauses with suspicion, reading ambiguous terms against the defen-
dant. Holmes’s conclusions suggest that many U.S. courts are similarly apprehensive 
about allowing parties to expressly opt out of legal liability altogether. 
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  Opt-Out Rule 
  Manifest Intent Express Statement 
No 
Enforcement I II 
Default 
Enforcement III IV 
 
Oversimplifying somewhat, we might fill in these boxes as follows. 
Category I describes the English rule without any evidentiary pre-
sumptions, which would impose a nonenforcement default, com-
bined with an opt-out rule, that requires courts to look at the par-
ties’ all-things-considered manifest intent. In practice, English 
courts today apply that rule primarily in noncommercial cases, such 
as domestic agreements.83 In category II is the old writ of covenant, 
which also adopted a nonenforcement default but required a for-
mal act to opt out of it and into enforcement. Also in Category II is 
the Model Written Obligations Act, which would impose the same 
nonenforcement default for gratuitous promises but allow an opt-
out by any express statement of intent to be bound. Category III 
includes the Restatement rule as written, as well as the English rule 
as applied to commercial agreements, with its strong evidentiary 
presumption of an intent to contract. Both adopt an enforcement 
default, while the opt-out rule suggests that courts engage in an all-
things-considered inquiry into the parties’ manifest intent. Finally, 
an example of a category IV rule can be found in the application of 
the Restatement rule to commercial agreements. As noted above, 
in practice, U.S. courts adopt an enforcement default and require 
 
83 See Atiyah, supra note 8, at 155–59 (same);  Chitty on Contracts, supra note 30, at 
204–12 (describing types of cases in which the parties’ intent to contract is litigated); 
Treitel, supra note 30, at 150–57 (same). 
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parties expressly to state their intent not to be bound in order to 
opt out of it. Depending on the strength of the English rule’s pre-
sumption of a contractual intent in commercial cases, this might 
also describe the application of the English rule. 
B. Interpretive Asymmetries, Desirable Stickiness, and Relational 
Costs 
The above table provides a basic menu of design options for 
identifying the parties’ intent with respect to legal liability. We can 
choose from the menu by asking which combination of opt-out and 
default creates the greatest value at the lowest cost. The next Part 
explores which combination we should choose for four categories 
of transactions: gratuitous promises, preliminary agreements, do-
mestic agreements and reporters’ confidentiality promises. Before 
getting there, I want to identify three considerations that are espe-
cially salient to the design of rules for interpreting parties’ intent to 
contract. 
The first concerns the relative stickiness of different interpretive 
defaults. In defending his thesis that noneconomic theories do not 
tell us much about what formation rules should look like, Richard 
Craswell argues for the “symmetry of the default rule problem”: 
In one sense, a default rule of implied commitment represents a 
greater “imposition” than a default rule of noncommitment, 
since an implied commitment can lead to judicially enforceable 
damages while an implied noncommitment cannot. However, 
neither rule is “imposed” in the sense of forcing [a party] to ac-
cept a legal relationship against her will, since each is merely a 
default rule which allows her to specify a different relationship 
whenever she chooses. For this reason, the intuition that legal re-
lationships should not be “imposed” on a party cannot, by itself, 
provide a reason for selecting one default rule over the other.84
84 Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481, 
485–86 (1996) [hereinafter Craswell, Offer, Acceptance]; see also Richard Craswell, 
Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 
503–04 (1989). 
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This cannot be right for rules that test for parties’ contractual in-
tent as a condition of contractual validity.85 If the goal is to condi-
tion legal liability on the parties’ intent to contract, and if the law 
uses an express opt-out rule, an enforcement default will be sys-
tematically stickier than a nonenforcement default. Express opt-
outs work only for parties who know what the default is, what it 
takes to contract around it, and, most important for present pur-
poses, that the rule applies to them. If, for example, the parties 
have not thought about legal liability (Corbin’s livestock traders) 
or mistakenly think that there is no contract for other reasons (the 
Restatement’s book seller and buyer), they do not know enough to 
opt-out of enforcement expressly. Parties who intend legal en-
forcement, on the contrary, are at least aware that it is in the off-
ing. Consequently, when the law adopts an express opt-out, a 
nonenforcement default is more likely to give parties who intend 
enforcement a reason to reveal that intent than an enforcement de-
fault is to give parties who do not intend to be legally bound an in-
centive to reveal theirs. In short, enforcement defaults are system-
atically stickier. 
The asymmetry exists only if the opt-out rule requires an express 
statement of intent, such as adherence to a legal formality or saying 
that one intends enforcement. If an enforcement default is instead 
combined with a manifest-intent opt-out rule—if the rule instructs 
courts to examine the totality of the circumstances to determine 
the objectively reasonable interpretation of the parties’ intent—
parties might avoid legal liability despite their ignorance of the rule 
or the possibility of enforcement. Because under a manifest-intent 
opt-out rule the parties need not undertake special acts to avoid 
the default interpretation, opting out does not presuppose knowl-
edge of the rule or its applicability. And while it is true that the risk 
85 Craswell’s symmetry thesis is correct as applied to interpretive rules that concern 
terms in a contract that are presumed valid. With respect to these rules, we cannot say 
a priori that the parties’ ignorance of the law or of their potential legal liability will 
systematically make one or the other default more or less sticky. That will depend on 
empirical facts, such as whether more parties prefer one or another term and the rela-
tive legal sophistication of parties preferring one or another term. The distinction 
here is something like Craswell’s between “background rules” and “agreement rules” 
in Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, supra note 84, at 
503. The above quoted text, however, addresses “agreement rules”—rules that fix the 
conditions of contractual validity. 
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of court error under a manifest-intent rule may cause sophisticated 
parties to state their intent expressly where unsophisticated parties 
might remain silent, the incentive to do so is the same whether a 
sophisticated party’s preferences match the default or not. Absent 
additional empirical assumptions, there is much less reason to 
think that an enforcement default combined with a manifest-intent 
opt-out rule will be systematically stickier than a nonenforcement 
default. 
The second point concerns the potential value of sticky defaults 
and therefore also of costly opt-out rules.86 Up to this point, the 
analysis has largely assumed that the only goal in interpreting the 
parties’ intent with respect to legal liability is to better enable them 
to realize their preferences—to enforce their agreements when the 
parties want to be bound and to withhold enforcement when they 
want no legal liability. That is, the above discussion has generally 
assumed that contract law’s sole function is to give parties the 
power to undertake new legal obligations when they wish. It is far 
from obvious, however, that this is the law of contracts’ only pur-
pose.87
There is little doubt that contract law is designed to give parties 
greater control over their legal obligations to one another. In 
H.L.A. Hart’s terms, contract law is a sort of private power-
conferring rule. It enables “the exercise of limited legislative pow-
ers by individuals,” which they can use to impose new legal duties 
on themselves.88 That fact does not preclude, however, additional 
and equally important duty-imposing functions. The law sometimes 
imposes liability on breaching promisors not because they entered 
into their agreements expecting or wanting enforcement, but be-
cause the promisor purposively induced a promisee to rely on an 
act she then failed to perform, because the promisor accepted a 
present benefit in exchange for her future performance, or because 
there is a social interest in supporting the practice of undertaking 
86 For a discussion of the many reasons defaults tend to be sticky, see Zamir, supra 
note 76, at 1753–68. 
87 A more thorough discussion of the themes in this and the following paragraphs 
can be found in Klass, supra note 14. The pluralist theory of contract law I describe in 
that article is something like a reinvention of Lon Fuller’s wheel. See Duncan Ken-
nedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Con-
sideration and Form”, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 94 (2000). 
88 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 96 (2d ed. 1994). 
KLASS_BOOK 9/17/2009 5:26 PM 
1472 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:1437 
 
and performing voluntary obligations.89 Stickier defaults, and by 
implication costlier opt-outs, serve such duty-imposing functions. 
More to the point, they can mediate between the sometimes con-
flicting interests the law has in, on the one hand, granting parties 
the power to control the scope of their legal obligations and, on the 
other hand, imposing liability on parties because of extralegal 
wrongs they have committed, harms they have caused, or other 
considerations. 
One place where these duty-imposing reasons are obviously at 
work is in the treatment of cases in which the parties have no pref-
erence one way or the other with respect to legal enforcement, ei-
ther because they have not considered the possibility or because 
they are indifferent to it. I argued above that these no-preference 
cases are among the reasons an enforcement default can be sys-
tematically stickier than a nonenforcement default. If the law’s sole 
concern were to enforce only agreements that the parties mani-
festly intended to be binding, that stickiness would be a problem. It 
is not a problem, however, if contract law also functions to impose 
duties on persons. Recall Corbin’s example of an agreement to 
trade a horse for a cow between two naïfs who have never heard of 
the law of contracts. If there are reasons to impose legal liability 
for breaching such an agreement, there are also reasons to prefer a 
sticky enforcement default, one that captures such no-preference 
cases. 
Those reasons can extend beyond the no-preference case to sup-
port the enforcement of agreements even where, absent transac-
tion costs, the parties would have agreed not to be legally bound. If 
the law has an interest, for example, in compensating promisees 
who have been wronged by a breach, it has that interest even in 
cases where one or even both parties might, at the time of forma-
tion, have preferred no enforcement, or where, in the absence of 
89 For the first two functions—protecting reliance and preventing unjust enrich-
ment—see, for example, P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (1981), and Lon L. 
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 806–13 (1941). The reliance-
protecting function of contract law is also defended by Neil MacCormick in Voluntary 
Obligations and Normative Powers—I, 46 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 59, 62–73 (Supp. 
1972). For the idea that contract law supports the practice of undertaking and per-
forming voluntary obligations, see Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 
Harv. L. Rev. 916, 933–38 (1982) (reviewing P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law 
(1981)). 
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transaction costs, one party would have traded away her right to 
enforcement. This is not to say that a contract law supported by 
such principles must be entirely indifferent to party preferences. 
By combining an enforcement default with a relatively costly opt-
out rule, we can permit sophisticated and sufficiently motivated 
parties to avoid legal obligations they would otherwise owe one 
another without significantly impairing the duty-imposing func-
tions of contract law. If contract law serves both a duty-imposing 
and a power-conferring function, rules for interpreting the parties’ 
contractual intent as a condition of contractual validity can mediate 
conflicts between those functions. 
The final observation concerns a special cost to the parties of 
express opt-out rules. Something like the idea can be found in Lisa 
Bernstein’s description of why parties sometimes choose not to 
provide in their contracts for all foreseeable eventualities: 
Transactors may also fail to include written provisions dealing 
with a particular contingency because each may fear that the 
other will interpret a suggestion that they do so as a signal that 
the transactor proposing the provisions is unusually litigious or 
likely to resist flexible adjustment of the relationship if circum-
stances change. These potential relational costs of proposing ad-
ditional explicit provisions may result in aspects of a contracting 
relationship being allocated to the extralegal realm, particularly 
in contexts where the post-contract-formation relationship be-
tween the transactors is highly relational in nature so that trans-
actors’ perceptions of the value of the transaction will be strongly 
affected by the attitudinal signals sent during pre-contractual ne-
gotiation.90
Eyal Zamir similarly observes that the costs of contracting around 
a default include “the adverse effects on the spirit of trust, confi-
dence, and cooperation between the parties, which may be essen-
tial to the success of the enterprise.”91 The relational costs Bern-
stein and Zamir describe attach to expressly opting out of default 
terms in enforceable agreements. Both are talking about contract 
gap-filling rules. Even more significant relational costs can apply to 
90 Bernstein, supra note 12, at 1789–90 (footnotes omitted). 
91 Zamir, supra note 76, at 1756–57. 
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expressly opting out of enforcement or nonenforcement altogether. 
An expressed preference for legal liability early in the transaction 
might be taken, for example, as evidence of distrust or a propensity 
to litigate. An expressed preference for no legal liability might be 
taken as evidence that the party might not perform, or that she 
does not trust the other side not to engage in opportunistic litiga-
tion. A requirement that parties who want, or who do not want, a 
legal guarantee of performance say so will, in many contexts, in-
volve such relational costs. 
We can expect these costs to be especially high at the beginning 
of contractual relationships.92 As Bernstein observes, contract law 
is largely designed as an “end-game norm,” sorting out what is 
owed to whom when an economic relationship has reached its 
end.93 Many transactions, however, are sustained by extralegal “re-
lationship-preserving” norms and incentives, such as mutual bene-
fit, trust, industry practice, and reputation. Particularly at the early 
stages of relational contracts, where both parties understand that 
the transaction’s value depends on their ability to work together to 
resolve disputes, one party’s expressed attitude towards the avail-
ability of legal liability as an end-game norm might be a deal 
breaker. And even if the deal still happens, forcing the parties to 
express their end-game preferences at the beginning of their rela-
tionship can erode relationship-preserving norms that would oth-
erwise add value to the transaction. Even where expectations or 
preferences regarding legal liability are mutually understood, those 
attitudes are often better left unspoken. 
The existence and magnitude of these relational costs depend on 
the context. Many agreements clearly contemplate legal liability, 
whether the parties say so or not. A choice of law, choice of forum, 
or liquidated damages clause, for example, already signals that the 
92 But similar considerations may also explain why we do not require parties who 
make one-sided modifications to say that they also intend to change their legal rela-
tionship. This is so, for example, when one party agrees to forgo some of her contrac-
tual rights for the sake of preserving the relationship. While both parties to the modi-
fication might understand and prefer that the modification be legally binding, 
expressing that preference can interfere with the function of the proffered concession, 
which is inter alia to signify cooperation or goodwill. 
93 Bernstein, supra note 12, at 1796–1802. See generally Lisa Bernstein, The Ques-
tionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 
66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 760–76 (1999). 
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parties understand themselves to be entering into a contract. In 
such transactions, also saying, “This is a legally enforceable agree-
ment,” would have no relational costs. In other agreements, the 
costs will be higher. Stuart Macaulay observes that “[b]usinessmen 
often prefer to rely on ‘a man’s word’ in a brief letter, a handshake, 
or ‘common honesty and decency’—even when the transaction in-
volves exposure to serious risks.”94 In such circumstances, a re-
vealed preference for legal liability could do significant harm. 
The relational costs of an express opt-out rule also depend on 
the parties’ backgrounds and expectations. Consider Patricia Wil-
liams’ story about the different ways she, as a black woman, and 
her white male colleague experienced entering into a formal resi-
dential lease. The two had similar relational goals: “We both 
wanted to establish enduring relationships with the people in 
whose houses we would be living; we both wanted to enhance trust 
of ourselves and to allow whatever closeness, whatever friendship, 
was possible.”95 For Williams’ white male colleague, this meant 
avoiding “conventional expressions of power and a preference for 
informal processes generally.”96 Williams’ experiences as a black 
woman, on the contrary, led her to associate informality with the 
potential for exploitation and distrust. As she said, “to show that I 
can speak the language of lease is my way of enhancing trust . . . in 
my business affairs.”97 For Williams’ colleague, an expressed pref-
erence for enforcement would degrade the relationship; for Wil-
liams, such an expression would enhance it. The relational costs of 
an express opt-out are not only transactionally relative, but also 
transactor-specific. 
IV. APPLICATIONS 
The above analysis has operated at a relatively high level of ab-
straction. I have identified four categories of rules for interpreting 
parties’ contractual intent, each defined by the type of interpretive 
default and opt-out rule it employs. I have also described three 
94 Macaulay, supra note 62, at 58. 
95 Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed 
Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 407 (1987). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
KLASS_BOOK 9/17/2009 5:26 PM 
1476 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:1437 
considerations that are especially relevant to interpreting the par-
ties’ contractual intent: the asymmetry of the default problem, the 
possible duty-imposing benefits of sticky defaults and costly opt-
outs, and the context-specific relational costs of express opt-out 
rules. These considerations should figure into an analysis of the 
many variables—the potential costs and benefits—relevant to the 
relative desirability of different interpretive approaches. Some of 
those variables are empirically given, such as the costs to the par-
ties of expressly opting out, the effect of such costs on the likeli-
hood that parties will opt out, error rates under different defaults, 
and the ratio of those who want legal liability to those who do not. 
Fixing the values of other variables calls for normative judg-
ments—whether and when, for example, to channel some parties 
towards or away from legal enforcement, and to what degree the 
law should take account of parties’ preferences for or against legal 
liability. 
Viewed in the abstract, the design problem can appear intracta-
ble. There are many variables; we know very little about the values 
of some; it is difficult to agree on the values of others. If the project 
were to discover a single rule for the broad range of agreements 
that can qualify as contracts, the cost-benefit equation might well 
be insoluble. There is simply too little information and too much 
diversity to determine a single best generic interpretive rule. 
The design question is easier to answer with respect to specific 
transaction types, where our sense of the salient costs and benefits 
is clearer, and the values at stake less contested—or so I will argue 
in this Part. I apply the above analytic framework to four catego-
ries of agreement: gratuitous promises, preliminary agreements, 
spousal agreements, and reporters’ confidentiality promises. The 
rules governing these agreement types are not of equal economic 
or social importance. Preliminary agreements are often litigated 
and commonly involve large sums, while there are few cases deal-
ing with reporters’ confidentiality promises, evidence perhaps of 
the strength of journalistic norms. An analysis of how the law 
should approach these different types of agreements, however, will 
give specific content to the more abstract discussion in the previous 
Part. One goal is to cast new light on the law’s treatment of these 
different agreement types. And whether or not the reader agrees 
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with my conclusions, I hope the analysis will demonstrate the value 
of the proposed framework. 
A. Gratuitous Promises 
Gratuitous promises—gift promises and other promises without 
consideration—are a relatively easy case under the framework. 
Many courts will not enforce a gratuitous promise in the absence of 
promisee reliance. This is so even if the promise is supported by 
nominal consideration, though the exchange of a peppercorn 
clearly expresses a preference for enforcement. In the familiar 
words of Judge Woolsey, “The parties may shout consideration to 
the housetops, yet, unless consideration is actually present, there is 
not a legally enforceable contract.”98 As Williston and others note, 
this is an odd rule: “It is something, it seems to me, that a person 
ought to be able to do, if he wishes to do it,— to create a legal obli-
gation to make a gift. Why not? . . . I don’t see why a man should 
not be able to make himself liable if he wishes to do so.”99 If one 
agrees with Williston, the design question is how the law should de-
termine when a gratuitous promisor wishes to make herself legally 
liable for a breach of her promise. 
The answer will include both an interpretive default and an opt-
out rule. There are three reasons to prefer a nonenforcement de-
fault for gratuitous promises. The first is an empirical sense that 
nonenforcement is the majoritarian default. Most parties who 
make gratuitous promises neither want nor expect legal liability. 
Second, if the law adopts an express opt-out (and I will argue it 
should), there is the asymmetry in stickiness. A gratuitous promi-
98 In re Greene, 45 F.2d 428, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). For an overview of the treatment 
of nominal consideration in U.S. law, see Joseph Siprut, Comment, The Peppercorn 
Reconsidered: Why a Promise to Sell Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not 
Binding, But Should Be, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1809, 1811–30 (2003). 
99 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and Proceedings 194 (1925); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Changing Your Mind: The 
Law of Regretted Decisions 82–88 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Law 99 (6th ed. 2003) (“The real mystery in the ‘moral consideration’ cases is why the 
law doesn’t simply make available a form for making binding promises without re-
quiring consideration . . . . Promises made under seal were enforceable without con-
sideration. This was, seemingly, a useful device; its disappearance is a puzzle.”); 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640, 659–60 
(1982). 
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sor who intends her promise to be binding knows enough to at 
least ask what the law requires to make it so; the gratuitous promi-
sor who does not intend that her promise be enforced because the 
idea has not occurred to her, or because she mistakenly believes 
that it is unenforceable for other reasons, does not. If the primary 
reason to enforce a gratuitous promise absent reliance is that the 
promisor wanted enforcement, the stickiness of an enforcement de-
fault is problematic. Third, there are reasons to prefer less, rather 
than more, enforcement of gratuitous promises. One is courts’ in-
ability to judge the defenses appropriate for gratuitous promisors. 
Melvin Eisenberg makes this argument with respect to improvi-
dence and ingratitude: 
An inquiry into improvidence involves the measurement of 
wealth, lifestyle, dependents’ needs, and even personal utilities. 
An inquiry into ingratitude involves the measurement of a mael-
strom, because many or most donative promises arise in an inti-
mate context in which emotions, motives, and cues are invariably 
complex and highly interrelated. Perhaps the civil-law style of ad-
judication is suited to wrestling with these kinds of inquiries, but 
they have held little appeal for common-law courts, which tradi-
tionally have been oriented toward inquiry into acts rather than 
into personal characteristics.100
Alternatively, or in addition, one might see a risk that widespread 
enforcement will erode the value of gratuitous promises. Eisenberg 
makes this point as well: 
Making simple affective donative promises enforceable would 
have the effect of commodifying the gift relationship. Legal en-
forcement of such promises would move the gifted commodity, 
rather than the affective relationship, to the forefront and would 
submerge the affective relationship that a gift is intended to to-
temize. Simple donative promises would be degraded into bills of 
exchange, and the gifts made to perform such promises would be 
degraded into redemptions of the bills.101
100 Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 662 (footnote omitted). 
101 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in The Theory of Contract Law: 
New Essays 206, 230 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). 
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Though enforcement is the stickier default, some promisors who 
prefer enforcement will fail to contract around a nonenforcement 
default. This residual stickiness of the nonenforcement default is a 
good thing given the social preference for not enforcing gratuitous 
promises. 
What of the opt-out rule? If Eisenberg’s arguments are correct, 
we should also prefer an opt-out rule that is more costly to the par-
ties, which will in turn increase the stickiness of the nonenforce-
ment default. This will be an express opt-out, rather than an all-
things-considered examination of the parties’ manifest intent. But 
greater stickiness is not the only or most significant reason for an 
express opt-out. Such a rule also avoids the verification costs asso-
ciated with manifest-intent rules, which include both the cost of ju-
dicial resources and the cost of judicial error. The risk of error 
might be of special concern in the case of gratuitous promises, for 
reasons Eisenberg describes. 
The relational costs of requiring gratuitous promisors who want 
enforcement to state that preference are minimal. These are not 
cases where enforcement is requested as the price of a return 
promise or performance. Rather, a gratuitous promisor’s declara-
tion that her promise shall be enforceable is freely given along with 
the promise. In most cases, such an additional gift would not un-
dermine the purpose of the gratuitous promise as a whole, or oth-
erwise erode the parties’ trust in one another. 
If we agree with Williston that gratuitous promisors should have 
the power to bind themselves legally, the sensible rule is a nonen-
forcement default combined with an express opt-out rule—a type 
II rule in my schema. This is precisely what the Model Written Ob-
ligations Act (drafted by Williston) proposes: “A written release or 
promise hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or 
promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consid-
eration, if the writing also contains an additional express statement, 
in any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally 
bound.”102 Since the Model Act was promulgated in 1925, only 
Pennsylvania and Utah have adopted it, and only Pennsylvania re-
tains the rule. Perhaps the problem of gratuitous promises is less 
important in practice than it is to the theory of contract law. Or 
102 Uniform Written Obligations Act § 1, supra note 40, at 584. 
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perhaps there is a deeper resistance to the Act’s premise: that 
promisors should be able to choose when they shall be legally 
bound to perform. The latter would also explain the law’s refusal 
to enforce promises for nominal consideration, for a peppercorn 
also expresses an intent to be bound.103 The explanation is not, 
however, that the Model Act is poorly drafted, or that it picks out 
the wrong rule for interpreting the parties’ contractual intent. 
B. Preliminary Agreements 
Turning to preliminary agreements, there is yet another design 
option to consider. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have recently 
argued for replacing the current, manifest-intent rule for prelimi-
nary agreements with what is, in effect, a more tailored default.104 
Their proposal complicates the design problem. The question is 
whether the current manifest-intent rule, Schwartz and Scott’s 
more tailored default, or a generic default with an express opt-out 
provides the best rule. 
As noted above, courts will enforce a preliminary agreement 
only if the plaintiff can show that the parties intended it to be en-
forceable. To quote Judge Leval in Teachers Insurance again: 
There is a strong presumption against finding binding obligation 
in agreements which include open terms, call for future approvals 
and expressly anticipate future preparation and execution of con-
tract documents. Nonetheless, if that is what the parties intended, 
courts should not frustrate their achieving that objective or dis-
appoint legitimately bargained contract expectations.105
103 There is, however, a difference between a peppercorn as a signal of contractual 
intent and an express statement of such intent: a peppercorn does not wear its mean-
ing on its sleeve. Another reason for rejecting the peppercorn rule therefore is that 
nominal consideration is a bad opt-out rule, which is likely to result in party error 
when one side does not understand the act’s meaning or effect. This might explain 
why nominal consideration is sufficient to support the enforcement of an irrevocable 
offer or a promise to act as a surety, but not the enforcement of most other sorts of 
agreements. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 87–88 (1981). Irrevocable of-
fers and surety agreements are usually made by sophisticated parties, who can be pre-
sumed to understand the legal meaning of a peppercorn. 
104 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661 (2007). 
105 Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 499 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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This approach is essentially that of the English rule, or a type I rule 
in my schema: it adopts a nonenforcement default combined with 
an opt-out rule instructing courts to look to the totality of the cir-
cumstances to determine whether the parties intended legal liabil-
ity.106 In Teachers Insurance, those circumstances included the lan-
guage of agreement, the context of negotiations, with particular 
attention to the parties’ motives, the number of open terms, the ex-
tent to which the agreement had been performed, and usage of 
trade.107 Farnsworth lists yet more factors courts consider, including 
“the kind of parties involved, the importance of the deal, and 
above all the nature of the transaction,” all of which are generally 
verifiable only by way of extrinsic evidence.108 The result of this 
wide-ranging inquiry into the parties’ contractual intent mirrors 
experience with strict applications of the English rule without the 
strong presumption of intent or other evidentiary rules: a high de-
gree of indeterminacy in case outcomes. Thus, Alan Schwartz and 
Robert Scott observe that “[a]ny list of relevant factors confines a 
court’s discretion to some extent, but [courts’ approach to prelimi-
nary agreements] leaves the decision process largely obscure when, 
as with these factors, courts fail to attach weights to the factors or 
to specify the relationship among them.”109 Farnsworth is more suc-
cinct: “It would be difficult to find a less predictable area of con-
tract law.”110
106 Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Empro suggests that courts should limit the in-
quiry by excluding parol evidence when the preliminary agreement is in writing. His 
argument for that rule involves a sleight of hand: Easterbrook correctly observes that 
the question of intent is an objective one, from which he incorrectly concludes that 
“[p]arties may decide for themselves whether the results of preliminary negotiations 
bind them . . . through their words.” Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 
423, 425 (7th Cir. 1989). The parties’ objective intent is usually understood as the in-
tent a reasonable observer would attribute them in light of the totality of the circum-
stances, not only on the basis of their words. In any case, Empro’s textualist approach 
similarly ends up considering multiple factors: the text, the structure of the document 
as a whole, and the implicit meaning of terms. See id. at 425–26. 
107 670 F. Supp. at 499–503. 
108 Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 261 (footnotes omitted); see also Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 104, at 675–76. 
109 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 104, at 676. 
110 Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 259–60. 
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Schwartz and Scott propose a different approach.111 They would 
replace the all-things-considered inquiry into the parties’ contrac-
tual intent with a more streamlined one, designed to determine 
whether legal enforcement of the preliminary agreement would 
add value to the transaction. Parties enter into preliminary agree-
ments, according to Schwartz and Scott, when they do not yet 
know if a deal will be profitable, when one or both can invest in a 
way that will answer that question, and when it is not possible to 
contract for such investments, for example, because the parties 
cannot observe each other’s cost functions.112 Schwartz and Scott 
provide a model of when enforcement encourages efficient invest-
ment in such situations, which involves familiar problems of sunk 
costs and shifting bargaining power.113 For my purposes, the details 
of that model are not so important as Schwartz and Scott’s conclu-
sion: legal enforcement of preliminary agreements adds value when 
“the parties have agreed on the nature of their project, on the na-
ture of the investment actions that each is committed to undertake, 
and on the order in which these actions are to be pursued.”114 
Schwartz and Scott recommend that courts drop the current open-
ended, multi-factored test for the parties’ contractual intent and 
ask instead only whether the preliminary agreement meets those 
three conditions. Absent the parties’ express statement of intent, 
111 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 104. Schwartz and Scott also have a descriptive the-
sis: that the holdings in preliminary agreement cases generally conform to their pro-
posed rule—that courts “appear to have an intuitive grasp of the necessary conditions 
for finding a preliminary agreement.” Id. at 701. And they have something to say 
about the proper scope of the parties’ legal duties under such an agreement and the 
proper remedy for its breach. Rather than have courts impose a duty to negotiate in 
good faith or fill the gaps in the agreement, Schwartz and Scott would have courts im-
pose a duty not to deviate from the agreed investment sequence. In the event of a 
breach, they suggest that the appropriate remedy is verifiable reliance damages. Id. at 
704. 
112 Id. at 677–78. 
113 Id. at 676–91. 
114 Id. at 701; see also id. at 704 (“[T]he parties must agree on the type of project, 
such as a shopping center or a financing; on an imprecise but workable division of au-
thority for investment behavior; and on the rough order in which their actions are to 
be taken.”). Schwartz and Scott’s argument does not demonstrate that legal enforce-
ment adds value only when these conditions are met. Their model, if successful, shows 
that enforcement adds value to precontractual agreements that meet these conditions, 
not that there are not other situations in which it does so. 
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satisfaction of these conditions would be necessary and sufficient to 
impose legal liability.115
One can read Schwartz and Scott’s thesis as a call for more tai-
lored majoritarian defaults combined with express opt-out rules—a 
combination of type II and type IV rules in my schema.116 Where 
enforcement is efficient, the parties are more likely to want it; 
where enforcement is inefficient, the parties are less likely to want 
it. For all the usual reasons that favor majoritarian defaults, 
Schwartz and Scott’s proposed inquiry into whether the parties to a 
preliminary agreement should have wanted legal liability is there-
fore a more predictable, and perhaps even a more reliable, test for 
their objective intent than is the unstructured inquiry into manifest 
intent in which courts currently engage. 
Still, this is a curious suggestion coming from Alan Schwartz and 
Robert Scott. The proposal is that instead of asking whether the 
parties wanted or appeared to want legal liability, courts should ask 
only whether they should have wanted it—whether at the time of 
the preliminary agreement it was in the parties’ interest that their 
agreement be enforceable. In other words, Schwartz and Scott 
would replace an inquiry into whether the parties thought legal li-
ability was in their interest with an inquiry into whether it actually 
was.117 The suggestion is curious because it runs contrary to a com-
mon methodological assumption among economists: that the par-
ties know best when they stand to benefit from one form of trans-
action or another, and that courts should therefore defer to their 
decisions wherever possible. Economists who study contract law 
commonly assume that the parties’ choice is the best available met-
115 Schwartz and Scott mention only that parties should be able to opt out of legal 
liability when their agreement meets the three conditions. Id. at 704. I am assuming 
that they would also permit parties to opt into such liability for agreements not meet-
ing their three criteria, so long as the agreement satisfies the other conditions of con-
tractual validity, such as reasonable certainty of terms. 
116 This is not the only reading of their proposal. We might instead read it along the 
lines of the duty-imposing reading of § 21 described in Section III.B above. On this 
reading, Schwartz and Scott recommend that courts depart from the intent inquiry 
altogether (except when the parties expressly say they do not want legal liability) and 
ask instead only about the efficiency of enforcement. But this would be a curious 
reading, given the considerations discussed in the next paragraph. 
117 Craswell adopts a similar approach to a variety of formation rules. Craswell, Of-
fer, Acceptance, supra note 84, at 544. 
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ric for value.118 Both Schwartz and Scott, for example, have criti-
cized the rule against penalties for licensing judicial second-
guessing of the parties’ choice of how to structure their legal rela-
tionship. Schwartz maintains: 
Courts do not have to prevent promisees from obtaining penalty 
clauses if promisees do not want penalty clauses. The ex ante rule 
is not merely unnecessary: judicial review produces mischief. 
Courts sometimes mistake compensatory damage measures for 
penalties, and so have found that particular liquidated damage 
clauses would inevitably overcompensate promisees when those 
clauses only protected the expectation. Thus, the ex ante branch 
of the liquidated damage rule should be abandoned.119
Scott has similarly argued that “the very existence of a freely nego-
tiated agreed damages provision is compelling presumptive evi-
dence that it constitutes the cost-minimizing alternative,” though 
the reasons why will often evade judicial inquiry.120 Schwartz and 
Scott’s tailored defaults for preliminary agreements take the oppo-
site approach, replacing an inquiry into whether the parties be-
lieved that legal enforcement was in their best interest with a judi-
cial judgment as to whether it was in their best interest. 
118 Richard Posner makes the general point: 
Now consider what to do about cases in which the parties’ intentions, as gleaned 
from the language of the contract or perhaps even from testimony, are at vari-
ance with the court’s notion of what would be the efficient term to interpolate 
into the contract. If the law is to take its cues from economics, should efficiency 
or intentions govern? Oddly, the latter. The people who make a transaction—
thus putting their money where their mouths are—ordinarily are more trust-
worthy judges of their self-interest than a judge (or jury), who has neither a per-
sonal stake in nor the first-hand acquaintance with the venture on which the 
parties embarked when they signed the contract. 
Posner, supra note 99, at 96. The classic critical diagnosis of this methodological 
commitment can be found in Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some 
Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451, 462–69 (1974). A general defense of 
this thesis, without reliance on efficiency as the ultimate value, can be found in Randy 
Barnett’s neo-Hayekian theory, the basics of which can be found in Barnett, Sound of 
Silence, supra note 9, at 832, and a more extended version in Randy E. Barnett, The 
Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law 29–40 (1998). 
119 Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supercompensatory Remedies: 
An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J. 369, 370 (1990). 
120 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Ef-
ficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554, 587, 588–93 (1977). 
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The same sorts of arguments that Schwarz and Scott marshal 
against the penalty rule can be applied to their tailored defaults for 
preliminary agreements. There are three reasons to think that 
Schwartz and Scott’s three-part test is an imperfect proxy for con-
tractual intent. The first is the familiar point about institutional 
competence and the likelihood of court error. While the proposed 
test is relatively simple, courts will sometimes make mistakes in 
their evaluation of whether the parties did in fact agree on the na-
ture of the project, on the investments that each was to undertake, 
or the order in which they were to pursue those investments. Sec-
ond, parties too can err. If the parties mistakenly believe that their 
preliminary agreement satisfies or does not satisfy the three-part 
test, whatever legal incentives the law would otherwise provide will 
have no traction with them. If the point of the enforcement of pre-
liminary agreements is to provide parties better incentives, it is im-
portant that the parties know when those incentives apply. Finally, 
there are reasons to doubt whether Schwartz and Scott’s model 
matches reality. In some cases, for example, extralegal incentives, 
such as reputation, the value of the ongoing relationship, hostage 
taking, or honor, provide sufficient assurances for a deal to go for-
ward without legal enforcement. The three-part test takes no ac-
count of such extralegal incentives. Nor can it. While such extrale-
gal assurances are generally transparent to the parties, it is difficult 
to devise a courtroom test for when they are present. Such incen-
tives are observable, but not verifiable. 
The point is not that Schwartz and Scott are guilty of some fun-
damental inconsistency. There are important differences between 
the rule against penalties and the modern rule for preliminary 
agreements. Most importantly, the existence of a liquidated dam-
age clause provides a simple, reliable test for party preference, 
while the current manifest-intent opt-out rule does not. Schwartz 
and Scott’s argument is not that their proposed rule is perfect, but 
only that it is better than the current multi-factored test used to de-
termine the parties’ intent. 
But this defense of the Schwartz-Scott proposal also suggests an 
alternative to it. If the problem with the existing rule for prelimi-
nary agreements is that the manifest-intent opt-out provides too lit-
tle certainty or predictability, the simpler solution is an express 
opt-out. Rather than attempting to tailor the default, we should 
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simply require parties who want legal liability for their preliminary 
agreements to say so, informing courts of their considered prefer-
ences. Parties entering into a preliminary agreement are best posi-
tioned to know whether they will benefit from legal liability than is 
a court during later litigation. By conditioning legal liability on an 
express contemporary statement of that preference, the law can 
give the parties a reason to share that information with the court 
and each other—to generate simple and reliable evidence of their 
intent. Imposing this minimal ex ante cost on parties who want le-
gal liability obviates the need for Schwartz and Scott’s expensive ex 
post judicial inquiry into efficiency. 
What of the other variables relevant to determining the best rule 
for interpreting the parties’ contractual intent? A few facts bear 
mention. Most preliminary agreement cases involve sophisticated 
parties represented by lawyers in negotiations over high-value 
transactions.121 The negotiations are typically lengthy, complex, and 
relatively adversarial. And in most cases that reach the courts, the 
preliminary agreement has been reduced to writing.122 Taken to-
gether, these facts suggest that it is generally clear to the parties 
that they are moving toward a legally enforceable agreement. 
What remains uncertain is whether they have yet reached one. 
These observations suggest that neither the out-of-pocket costs 
of an express opt-out nor party error costs should be especially 
worrisome. Particularly where the preliminary agreement is al-
121 Of 87 cases that Westlaw identified as “examining” or “discussing” Teachers’ In-
surance (three or four stars), 53 applied the rule. Of those, 43 cases concerned pre-
liminary agreements between corporate entities (though in several principles or other 
individuals were also named parties), and 44 involved claims worth one-million dol-
lars or more. Forty-six of the 53 cases fell into one or both of those categories. See, 
e.g., Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. APE Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 95–96 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (finding a binding preliminary agreement in business transaction worth tens 
of millions of dollars); Trianco LLC v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 583 F. Supp. 2d 649, 
653, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (finding a Type II agreement for a subcontractor bid on a 
$300,000,000 government contract deal); see also Mark Andrew of Palm Beaches, 
Ltd., v. GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corp., 265 F. Supp. 2d. 366, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (finding no binding preliminary agreement on a nine-million-dollar commercial 
loan agreement); Spencer Trask Software & Info. Servs. LLC v. RPost Int’l Ltd., 383 
F. Supp. 2d 428, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding no binding preliminary agreement in a 
venture capital transaction). 
122 Of the 53 cases applying Teachers’ Insurance described in the previous note, 48 
involved a written agreement. Of the 14 decisions from the set that held the prelimi-
nary agreement to be enforceable, 13 involved a written agreement. 
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ready in writing, the costs of adding words to the effect of “This is a 
legally enforceable agreement” are minimal. And if the parties are 
sophisticated players represented by counsel, there is little chance 
they will forget to add those words or expect enforcement in their 
absence. Nor are the relational costs particularly high. In most pre-
liminary agreements, the scope of legal liability is among the issues 
under discussion. Legal enforcement is already on the table. This 
diminishes the relational costs of having to say precisely when en-
forcement shall attach. 
The above arguments all go to the value of an express opt-out. 
There are two reasons to prefer a nonenforcement default. First, 
that default corresponds to the general aleatory view of negotia-
tions in U.S. law. There is no obligation to negotiate in good faith, 
and parties are free to walk away from negotiations for any or no 
reason. Unless or until there is a shift in U.S. law on this point, an 
enforcement default for preliminary agreements would be anoma-
lous and potentially confusing. The second reason lies in the tem-
poral structure of contracting.123 Parties enter negotiation from the 
position of no contract and eventually reach a point where legal 
obligations attach. An enforcement default would require some 
test for when the parties had reached sufficient agreement to flip 
the default from nonenforcement to enforcement, and then require 
the parties to opt out again if they preferred no enforcement. The 
nonenforcement default means that the parties cross the enforce-
ment line only once, and leaves it to them to tell courts when they 
do so. 
Taken together, these facts recommend rejecting Schwartz and 
Scott’s proposed complex test in favor of a simple type II rule: a 
nonenforcement default together with an express opt-out. A pre-
liminary agreement should not be enforced unless the parties said 
they meant it to be. Unlike the argument with respect to gratuitous 
promises, the reason for such a rule is not majoritarian, but turns 
on the value of an information-forcing default. We can achieve 
greater accuracy at a lower cost by requiring parties who want to 
be bound to their preliminary agreements to say so. 
123 I owe this point to Conrad Deitrick. 
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C. Spousal Agreements 
Domestic agreements are exchange agreements between 
spouses, between parents and children, or between other family 
members. This Section focuses on agreements between spouses, 
with special attention to agreements involving a promise to sup-
port. Here the arguments for and against enforcement are more 
complex and less settled, as is illustrated by a brief tour through the 
history of U.S. and English law in this area. 
It will be recalled that Balfour v. Balfour, the case that first es-
tablished the English rule, involved a spousal agreement: a hus-
band’s promise to provide his wife a monthly stipend in exchange 
for her implicit undertaking not to claim failure to support.124 That 
Balfour was a domestic-agreement case is not surprising. It had 
long been argued that domestic agreements and social arrange-
ments posed a special problem for contract law, one whose solution 
lay in requiring proof of the parties’ intent to contract. Hence Pol-
lock’s oft-quoted argument: 
An appointment between two friends to go out for a walk or to 
read a book together is not an agreement in the legal sense: for it 
is not meant to produce, nor does it produce, any new legal duty 
or right, or any change in existing ones. . . . 
Nothing but the absence of intention seems to prevent a contract 
from arising in many cases of this kind.125
Balfour is a judicial affirmation of Pollock’s thesis.126
124 The above description follows the trial judge’s account of the consideration in the 
case. [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 571–72. 
125 Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract at Law and In Equity: Third American 
from the Seventh English Edition 3 & n.c (Gustavus H. Wald & Samuel Williston 
eds., 1906). One finds a similar argument in Anson: 
On a like footing stand engagements of pleasure, or agreements which from 
their nature do not admit of being regarded as business transactions. . . . The 
acceptance of an invitation to dinner or to play in a cricket match forms an 
agreement in which the parties may incur expense in the fulfillment of their mu-
tual promises. The damages resulting from breach might be ascertainable, but 
the courts would probably hold that, as no legal consequences were contem-
plated by the parties, no action would lie. 
Anson, supra note 24, at 49. 
126 Atkin’s opinion in Balfour makes Pollock’s argument: 
[I]t is necessary to remember that there are agreements between parties which 
do not result in contracts within the meaning of that term in our law. The ordi-
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In the first edition of his treatise, Williston considered and re-
jected that thesis. His argument had two parts. First, many domes-
tic agreements and social arrangements are unenforceable in any 
case because they do not meet the consideration requirement: “the 
promise of the guest to attend the dinner is not given or asked for 
as the price of the host’s promise.”127 Second, in those few cases 
where there is consideration, the agreement should be enforced: 
“[t]here seems no reason why merely social engagements should 
not create contracts if the requisites for the formation of a contract 
already enumerated exists.”128 When Williston drafted Section 20 of 
the First Restatement (the ancestor of Section 21 in the Second 
Restatement), the text was therefore silent as to domestic or social 
agreements. In Williston’s view, they did not require a separate 
rule. 
This changed in the Second Restatement, which added a new 
comment on domestic agreements and social arrangements. The 
comment reflects some of Corbin’s intervening influence. Where 
Williston argued from principle against the need for a separate 
rule, Corbin’s treatise observed that courts in fact treated such 
agreements differently: 
If the subject matter and terms of a transaction are such as cus-
tomarily have affected legal relations and there is nothing to in-
dicate that the one now asserting their existence had reason to 
know that the other party intended not to affect his legal rela-
nary example is where two parties agree to take a walk together, or where there 
is an offer and an acceptance of hospitality. Nobody would suggest in ordinary 
circumstances that those agreements result in what we know as a contract, and 
one of the most usual forms of agreement which does not constitute a contract 
appears to me to be the arrangements which are made between husband and 
wife. . . . To my mind those agreements, or many of them, do not result in con-
tracts at all, and they do not result in contracts even though there may be what 
as between other parties would constitute consideration for the agreement. . . . 
[T]hey are not contracts because the parties did not intend that they should be 
attended by legal consequences. 
[1919] 2 K.B. at 578–79. 
127 1 Williston 1920 Edition, supra note 23 § 21, at 24 n.19. In the second edition, 
Williston applies the same argument to domestic arrangements: “The real difficulty, 
however, in finding a contract in such cases is that the parties do not manifest an in-
tent to make a bargain, that is, to exchange a promise for an agreed consideration.” 
Williston 1936 Edition, supra note 28, at 39 n.14. 
128 1 Williston 1920 Edition, supra note 23 § 21, at 23–24. 
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tions, then the transaction will be operative legally. . . . If the sub-
ject matter and terms are not such as customarily have affected 
legal relations, the transaction is not legally operative unless the 
expressions of the parties indicate an intention to make it so.129
While perhaps more attuned to what courts were doing, Corbin’s 
solution lacks the elegance of Williston’s categorical approach. 
Framed as a rule, it is arguably circular. A manifest intent to be 
bound is required where the “matter and terms are not such as cus-
tomarily have affected legal relations,” though such customs de-
pend on when the law requires a manifest intent to be bound. Per-
haps to avoid this objection, when the drafters of the Second 
Restatement added a new comment on social and domestic agree-
ments, they reformulated Corbin’s point as a rule of evidence for 
specified categories: “In some situations the normal understanding 
is that no legal obligation arises, and some unusual manifestation 
of intention is necessary to create a contract. Traditional examples 
are social engagements and agreements within a family group.”130 
The upshot is a black-letter rule that, in cases involving domestic 
agreements and social arrangements, there is a contract only if the 
parties manifestly intended one. If, in the case of commercial 
agreements, application of the English rule has moved towards the 
Restatement approach, then in the case of domestic agreements 
the text of the Restatement has moved towards the English rule. 
Partly for reasons described below, scholars on this side of the 
Atlantic have not explored the application of the Section 21 rule 
for domestic agreements. English and other commonwealth schol-
ars have paid more attention to such agreements, and especially 
agreements between spouses. Many have criticized courts’ applica-
tion of the English rule to spousal agreements. Several writers ar-
129 Corbin, supra note 22 § 34, at 138 (footnotes omitted). Corbin also was character-
istically attentive to the fuzziness of the line between these two categories:  
The line of division between what is ‘social’ on the one hand and what is legally 
operative on the other, between agreements that make contracts and those that 
do not, can be determined only by inductive study and comparison of what the 
courts have done in the past. Case by case, they have drawn a line, although like 
other lines, it is drawn with a wide and imperfect brush, not with a draftsman’s 
pen. Being drawn by many hands, there are gaps in places and there are con-
flicting lines in other places. 
Id. at 141. 
130 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 cmt. c (1981). 
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gue that the rule’s real purpose in these cases is to prevent contract 
law from intruding into relationships that, in the opinion of indi-
vidual judges, should be beyond the law’s reach. The purported fo-
cus on the parties’ intent is in fact a “smokescreen” for decisions 
whose real purpose is “keeping contract in its place.”131 On this 
skeptical reading of the English rule, the nonverifiability of the 
parties’ manifest intent is essential to the rule’s hidden function. 
Hedley therefore suggests that “[i]f liability were thought appro-
priate on certain facts, it could plausibly be made out as ‘intended’; 
if not, it would be easy to deny the existence of the requisite inten-
tion.”132 Because the intent question is indeterminate and malle-
able, courts can use it as cover for their policy-based decisions as to 
the proper reach of contract law. 
The decision in Balfour v. Balfour is exemplary on this reading. 
The Court of Appeal held that there was no contract based osten-
sibly on the fact that “the promise here was not intended by either 
party to be attended by legal consequences.”133 But the opinions 
discuss no evidence of what the parties before the court intended 
or appeared to intend with respect to legal liability. Instead, the 
opinions focus on the general desirability of legal interference in 
marital relations. “The common law does not regulate the form of 
agreements between spouses. . . . In respect of these promises each 
house is a domain into which the King’s writ does not seek to run, 
and to which his officers do not seek to be admitted.”134 Whatever 
the supposed ratio decidendi of the case, the outcome appears to 
have been driven by the court’s view that contract law should not 
intrude into the marital relationship. 
131 Sally Wheeler & Jo Shaw, Contract Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary 165 
(1994); Hedley, supra note 57. 
132 Hedley, supra note 57, at 403. 
133 Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579–80. 
134 Id. at 579 (Atkin, L.J.); see also id. at 577 (Duke, L.J.) (“The proposition that the 
mutual promises made in the ordinary domestic relationship of husband and wife of 
necessity give cause for action on a contract seems to me to go to the very root of the 
relationship, and to be a possible fruitful source of dissension and quarrelling. I can-
not see that any benefit would result from it to either of the parties, but on the other 
hand it would lead to unlimited litigation in a relationship which should be obviously 
as far as possible protected from possibilities of that kind.”); Hedley, supra note 57, at 
391–92 (“[E]ven a brief reading of their lordships’ judgments will show how reluctant 
they were to extend the law of contract into the area of matrimonial rights and du-
ties.”). 
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The smokescreen criticism of the English rule combines three 
separate arguments. The first and mildest rests on the premise that 
the law should be transparent: courts should say what they mean.135 
If the outcomes of domestic agreement cases are being driven by 
factors other than the parties’ manifest intent, courts should say so. 
Implicit in this criticism is the idea that courts will reach better re-
sults if they grapple with such considerations directly, forcing 
courts to weigh the costs and benefits of their decisions. The sec-
ond criticism is that the English rule gives judges too much discre-
tion in deciding when a domestic agreement will be enforced. Such 
discretion is problematic both because parties will not know the le-
gal consequences of their agreement, and because we might not 
trust judges to reach just decisions in these cases. Third, one can 
read the application of the English rule to domestic agreements as 
yet another example of the common law’s pernicious distinction 
between public and private, a distinction that purports to create a 
protected sphere of human liberty but in fact functions to sustain 
established inequalities and modes of domination. Accordingly, 
Mary Keyes and Kylie Burns argue that the nonenforcement de-
fault for spousal promises is “a highly effective default principle 
which impedes enforcement of family agreements, and performs a 
powerful symbolic function delineating the realm of law from the 
realm of the family and the feminine, privileging the former over 
the latter.”136 Many cases involving domestic agreements follow the 
fact pattern in Balfour: wife sues husband for breach of promise to 
support. By withholding enforcement in these cases, the English 
rule can covertly play a supporting role in a legal regime that sys-
tematically subordinates married women to their husbands. 
Judicial treatment of contracts between spouses in the United 
States has been less uniform. While I know of no recent systematic 
study, a sampling indicates a variety of approaches. In cases involv-
ing economic agreements, such as a business partnership or an 
agreement involving title to properties, courts have provided en-
forcement with no inquiry into the parties’ intent.137 Noneconomic 
135 For a general account of this principle, see Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincer-
ity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2008). 
136 Keyes & Burns, supra note 62, at 578. 
137 See, e.g., Dodson v. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 31 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1947) (agreement re-
garding proceeds of jointly-held property); Peaks v. Hutchinson, 53 A. 38 (Me. 1902) 
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agreements appear less likely to be enforced. Some cases conform 
to the Restatement approach. In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court considered a husband and wife’s agreement as to 
the use of frozen preembryos.138 While the agreement was evinced 
by the signatures on a clinic’s consent form, the court emphasized 
that “the record does not indicate, that the husband and wife in-
tended the consent form to act as a binding agreement between 
them should they later disagree as to the disposition.”139 In other 
cases, enforcement is denied on grounds that have nothing to do 
with the parties’ intent. An Illinois appeals court has held that a 
wife’s promise to amend a land trust agreement in exchange for her 
spouse’s “promise to continue to be a kind, loving and affectionate 
husband” was not supported by consideration.140 Alternatively, an 
Arizona appellate court refused to enforce an agreement that each 
spouse would support the other through graduate school on the 
grounds that the terms were too uncertain.141
One type of inter-spousal agreement appears with relative fre-
quency: agreements involving one spouse’s promise to support the 
other in exchange for some economic benefit. Reva Siegal and Jill 
Hasday have each cataloged courts’ hostility to agreements be-
tween spouses involving payment for services, which almost always 
involve a wife suing a husband or his estate for money owed.142 
They observe that U.S. courts commonly refuse enforcement in 
these cases for one or both of two reasons: the agreement is with-
out consideration, since the spouse has a preexisting duty to pro-
(agreement that building constructed by husband on wife’s land would remain hus-
band’s property); Papa v. Vacchina, 321 P.2d 245 (Nev. 1958) (agreement to pay sum 
to wife’s daughters); Horton v. Horton, 487 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1997) (wife’s promise to 
dissolve joint venture and execute power of attorney for payments from husband); 
Klotz v. Klotz, 117 S.E.2d 650, 651, 656 (Va. 1961) (business partnership agreement). 
138 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
139 Id. at 1056. The parties’ marriage relationship was not at the core of this decision. 
Later in the same decision, the court stated in dicta that “even had the husband and 
the wife entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves regarding the 
disposition of the frozen preembryos, we would not enforce an agreement that would 
compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will.” Id. at 1057. 
140 Lesnik v. Estate of Lesnik, 403 N.E.2d 683, 687 (Ill. App. 1980). 
141 Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 201 (Ariz. App. 1982). 
142 Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 491, 
500–02 (2005); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicat-
ing Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 Geo. L.J. 2127, 2174–96 (1994). 
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vide the bargained-for services, and the agreement is unenforce-
able on the grounds of public policy, since enforcement would al-
low the market to intrude into the marriage relationship, which 
should be governed by other norms.143 Unlike the rule in England, 
these holdings close the door on enforcement entirely, whether the 
parties intended legal liability or not. Like the application of Eng-
lish rule, however, they “appear to have systematically adverse dis-
tributional consequences for women and poorer people, maintain-
ing and increasing distributive inequality.”144
With these observations in hand, let me return to the design 
question, starting with spousal support agreements. First, whether 
or not we think the English rule as applied to agreements between 
spouses is an exercise in bad faith, at least it leaves room in theory 
for their enforcement—as distinguished from the approach of U.S. 
courts, which often precludes enforcement altogether. Second, the 
parties’ intent with respect to legal liability should not be irrelevant 
to the enforcement decision. There are legitimate worries here. 
One is undue influence. Spousal support agreements are not arms-
length transactions and often involve radically unequal bargaining 
power. No matter how clear the evidence of a party’s intent that 
the agreement be or not be enforced, there is reason to worry that 
it was not freely given. At the same time, a mandatory enforcement 
or nonenforcement rule would deny altogether spouses’ legitimate 
interests in controlling the scope of their legal obligations to one 
another. 
The history and distributive effects of nonenforcement of 
spousal support agreements suggests flipping the default and 
adopting a rule that such agreements are presumptively enforce-
able. We can expect an enforcement default for spousal agree-
ments to be especially sticky. The parties are less likely to be legal 
sophisticates or to be thinking about legal consequences. The ar-
gument for flipping the default adopts a positive attitude towards 
143 A recent example can be found in Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1993). There, the court reasoned both that “[p]ersonal performance of a per-
sonal duty created by the contract of marriage does not constitute a new considera-
tion,” and that the negotiations involved in “sickbed bargaining . . . are antithetical to 
the institution of marriage as the Legislature has defined it.” Id. at 20. 
144 Hasday, supra note 142, at 517. Siegal too emphasizes the “immense distributive 
consequences for women” of the prohibition on interspousal contracts for household 
labor. Siegel, supra note 142, at 2209. 
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that stickiness. A presumption that spousal support agreements are 
enforceable would work to erase the distinction of a protected pri-
vate sphere and provide the same protection to the victim of a 
spouse’s breach that the law provides victims of commercial 
breaches. This argument is not a majoritarian claim that most par-
ties to such agreements want enforcement. Nor is it a claim that the 
costs of contracting out of enforcement are less than those of con-
tracting out of nonenforcement, or that enforcement would be an 
information-forcing default. The argument is rather that there is a 
social interest in enforcing spousal agreements for support, one 
that does not turn on the parties’ initial intent. Greater enforce-
ment will disrupt bad power relationships that the law otherwise 
enables. And this is not the only social benefit. Promisee reliance 
in such cases often presents an especially compelling case for en-
forcement.145 And society has an obvious economic interest in en-
forcing a spouse’s promise of economic support or continuing care. 
We should flip the default because defaults in general, and the de-
fault for spousal agreements in particular, are sticky.146
145 Hedley argues that in most noncommercial transactions, judicial intuitions about 
the appropriateness of contractual liability turns on whether there has been any det-
rimental reliance. 
In [noncommercial] cases, the rule is that agreements will be enforced only at 
the insistence of a party who has performed one side of the bargain; but there is 
no need to prove any intention that sanctions be available. In other words, the 
courts’ concern is to prevent one side taking the benefits of the arrangement 
and refusing the burdens, but they are unconcerned at the prospect of breach of 
a purely executory arrangement. 
Hedley, supra note 57, at 406. 
146 Oddly enough, this argument suggests a defense of the form of the court’s argu-
ment in Balfour, if not its substance. In Balfour, the Court of Appeal decided a legal 
question of first impression: in contemporary terms, the appropriate default for 
spousal agreements. One might argue that the answer to that question should turn on 
the sorts of general policy considerations that the court discussed—the costs and 
benefits of treating “each house [as] a domain into which the King’s writ does not 
seek to run.” Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579. This is not to say that the Bal-
four court correctly identified or weighed those costs and benefits. Similar partial de-
fenses might be made for several other commonly criticized decisions under the Eng-
lish rule. See, e.g., President of the Methodist Conference v. Parfitt [1984] Q.B. 368, 
377 (refusing to find a contract of service based on an ecclesiastical employment 
agreement); Ford Motor Co. v. Amalgamated Union of Eng’g and Foundry Workers 
[1969] 1 W.L.R. 339, 355 (finding that no legal obligation arose from a collective bar-
gaining agreement). 
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What of the opt-out rule? The above considerations recommend 
a more costly opt-out rule—for example, a requirement that the 
parties expressly say when they do not want enforcement. The 
more the opt-out costs the parties, the stickier the default. An ex-
press opt-out rule would also address the first and second criticisms 
of the English rule: covert policy judgments and judicial discretion. 
But we must also take account of the relational costs of express 
opt-outs. In general, express opt-outs have relational costs because, 
as it is often said, contracts are often like marriages. Marriages are 
even more like marriages. An expressed preference that a promise 
to a spouse not be enforceable is much more likely to interfere 
with the relationship as a whole than the same expressed prefer-
ence in a commercial agreement. The concern here is not only that 
parties to spousal agreements who choose to opt out will pay a high 
relational price for doing so. If we care about party choice, it is just 
as important that, as a result of those costs, many who would oth-
erwise prefer to opt out will choose not to do so. Depending on 
how often the latter is the case, the more accurate test for the par-
ties’ objective intent might well be the manifest-intent test that 
English courts currently use (but instead with an enforcement de-
fault), which requires courts to examine the totality of the circum-
stances, asking whether it would be reasonable to ascribe the par-
ties such an intent in those circumstances. 
It is difficult to say in the abstract how these relational and party 
error costs should be weighed against the costs of judicial discre-
tion and court error that a manifest-intent opt-out imposes. If 
courts were to adopt a rule that applied only to spousal support 
agreements, I believe they would do better to require an express 
opt-out. The social interest in the enforcement of such agreements 
outweighs any unexpressed preference one or both parties might 
have for nonenforcement. Spousal support agreements should then 
be subject to a type IV rule: an enforcement default with an ex-
press opt-out. 
If the project is to craft a generic rule for spousal agreements, the 
relational costs of an express opt-out rule should weigh more heav-
ily. Here too we might want an enforcement default. But where the 
social interest in enforcement is less compelling, a requirement that 
spouses express their intent not to be legally bound might well re-
sult in too much enforcement. In many significant agreements be-
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tween spouses, it is unrealistic to expect the parties to state ex-
pressly their preference for or against enforcement in future dis-
putes. In these cases, we might do better with a type III rule: an en-
forcement default combined with a manifest-intent opt-out. This 
judgment depends in part on an empirical sense of how marriages 
work. It is also partly based on a sense that social attitudes towards 
marriage have changed, and that, with an enforcement default, 
judges today would be less likely to use a manifest-intent inquiry as 
an excuse for insulating spousal agreements from the law. But this 
is just to make the familiar point that the more we trust judges, the 
more comfortable we will be with less formalist modes of interpre-
tation. 
D. Reporters’ Promises of Confidentiality 
Similar considerations suggest a different rule for when courts 
should enforce a reporter’s promises of confidentiality to a 
source—a fact pattern that is rarely litigated, but whose analysis 
further illustrates the proposed framework. In Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co.,147 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that such a prom-
ise was not enforceable in contract, and that recovery under a the-
ory of promissory estoppel would violate the First Amendment. 
The court arrived at the first holding by departing sub silentio from 
the Restatement rule, explaining that it was “not persuaded that in 
the special milieu of media newsgathering a source and a reporter 
ordinarily believe they are engaged in making a legally binding 
contract.”148 The promissory estoppel holding was based on the free 
press clause of the First Amendment and was subsequently over-
turned by the U.S. Supreme Court.149 On remand, the Minnesota 
147 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990). Other courts that have considered the issue have 
generally followed Cohen’s holding, if not always its reasoning. See Ruzicka v. Conde 
Nast Publ’ns, Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Minnesota law); Pierce 
v. The Clarion Ledger, 452 F. Supp. 2d 661, 663–64 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Steele v. Isikoff, 
130 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Ventura v. The Cincinnati Enquirer, 
396 F.3d 784, 791–93 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a reporter’s confidentiality promise 
related to information concerning criminal activity was unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy). But see Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So.2d 63, 65 (Fla. 
App. 1998) (holding that source should have been permitted to plead breach of con-
tract and promissory estoppel). 
148 Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203. 
149 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991). 
KLASS_BOOK 9/17/2009 5:26 PM 
1498 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:1437 
 
Supreme Court concluded that the source was entitled to recovery 
on the basis of promissory estoppel.150
While the Minnesota Supreme Court’s first decision framed the 
contract issue in terms of the parties’ intent, the court did not dis-
cuss any particulars of the transaction between the parties. Instead, 
like the opinions in Balfour, the court focused on the general wis-
dom of enforcing agreements of that type. It explained that “con-
tract law seems here an ill fit for a promise of news source confi-
dentiality. To impose a contract theory on this arrangement puts an 
unwarranted legal rigidity on a special ethical relationship, preclud-
ing necessary consideration of factors underlying that ethical rela-
tionship.”151 The court’s First Amendment concerns about applying 
promissory estoppel also likely informed its decision as to en-
forcement in contract.152
While the first Cohen decision did not use the analytic frame-
work I have described, that framework supports both the court’s 
argument and its holding. The upshot of this decision of first im-
pression is a nonenforcement default for reporters’ promises of 
confidentiality. That default is supported by considerations of 
stickiness. The court’s discussion of the wisdom of enforcing confi-
dentially promises and its analysis of the First Amendment values 
at stake identify social interests in exempting reporters’ confidenti-
ality promises from the “legal rigidity” of contract. Those interests 
are promoted by a sticky nonenforcement default. 
Cohen does not say what the opt-out rule should be. But the 
court’s refusal to look at the specifics of the transaction or to re-
mand the case for additional findings suggests an express opt-out: 
A reporter or source who wants a confidentiality promise to be le-
gally enforceable must say so. This too seems right. First, the ex-
press opt-out rule makes the default all the more sticky, promoting 
society’s interests in not enforcing such agreements. And unlike 
spousal agreements, expressing a preference for legal enforcement 
is unlikely to damage the reporter-source relationship. While such 
relationships are often based on a degree of trust, the interests of 
the parties rarely align, and are sometimes—as in Cohen—at odds. 
150 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 390–92 (Minn. 1992). 
151 Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203. 
152 See id. at 203–05 (holding that First Amendment barred a promissory estoppel 
claim against the newspaper). 
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The mere fact that the source prefers the protection of contract law 
suggests a trust deficit, or that the relationship is already relatively 
adversarial. In such a context, expressing that preference is 
unlikely to cause the relationship much harm. Reporters’ confiden-
tiality promises should therefore be subject to a type II rule: a 
nonenforcement default together with an express opt-out. 
CONCLUSION: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE RESTATEMENT RULE 
The various categories of agreements I have discussed involve 
different empirical predicates and implicate different social inter-
ests. In each case, however, we can construct a rule for condition-
ing enforcement on the parties’ intent with respect to legal liability 
that roughly balances the various reasons for or against imposing 
legal liability. In the case of gratuitous promise, a straightforward 
majoritarian argument, together with a social interest in not en-
forcing such promises, support a sticky nonenforcement default, 
while the express opt-out is recommended to simplify ex post liti-
gation and because of its minimal relational costs. When it comes 
to preliminary agreements, the preferred rule is again a nonen-
forcement default combined with an express opt-out. Here, how-
ever, the reason involves information-forcing considerations: such 
a rule gives parties an incentive to tell courts when they think en-
forcement is in their interest. For spousal support agreements, an 
enforcement default is supported by social interests in enforcement 
that do not depend on the parties’ intent to be legally bound and 
that also suggest an express opt-out. In the case of spousal agree-
ments more generally, relational costs recommend a manifest-
intent opt-out rule. Finally, the reasons for not enforcing reporters’ 
confidentiality promises recommend a sticky nonenforcement de-
fault together with an express opt-out, which in this context is 
likely to have fewer relational costs. 
Taken as a whole, the analysis demonstrates the potential value 
of tailored defaults and opt-out rules that condition legal liability 
on the parties’ intent to contract. The law’s interests in enforcing 
voluntary obligations depend on the type of agreement at issue. 
Tailored rules for interpreting the parties’ intent to contract can 
partially incorporate those considerations into the conditions of 
contractual validity, striking different balances between reasons for 
granting persons the power to control their legal obligations to one 
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another and reasons for enforcing or not enforcing agreements that 
do not depend on the parties’ preferences or intentions. 
The above discussion provides new material for the interpreta-
tion of the generic rule described in Section 21 of the Second Re-
statement. I have suggested elsewhere two possible readings of the 
Restatement rule.153 On the first reading, the rule expresses a prin-
cipled commitment to sometimes imposing contractual duties for 
reasons other than the parties’ contractual intent. Contract law re-
quires “[n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be le-
gally binding”154 because our interests in holding breaching promi-
sors legally liable do not all involve party choice. On the second 
reading, the Restatement rule is not a statement of principle, but 
reflects a judgment about the epistemic limitations of courts and 
the practical requirements of contracting parties. Even if the only 
function of contract law is to give parties the power to alter their 
legal obligations when they wish, the English experience has shown 
that the parties’ manifest intent to contract is unsuitable as a condi-
tion of contractual validity. Absent formalities like the seal, that in-
tent is simply too difficult to verify. The Restatement rule, on this 
power-conferring reading, establishes a majoritarian default, leav-
ing it up to parties who do not intend legal liability to inform courts 
of their preference. 
The above analytic framework does not say which of these read-
ings is the better interpretation of Section 21. Answering that ques-
tion requires a broader inquiry into the structure of contract law as 
a whole and the principles that animate it. The analysis does, how-
ever, cast additional light on the commitments of each interpreta-
tion. 
The asymmetry of the default problem presents a challenge to 
power-conferring readings of the Restatement rule. Other things 
being equal, a commitment to party choice should recommend a 
nonenforcement default, which we can expect to be systematically 
less sticky. Power-conferring readings of the Restatement rule 
must explain why the rule adopts the stickier default: enforcement, 
plus what is in practice an express opt-out rule. That explanation 
will likely involve two empirical claims: that the vast majority of 
153 Klass, supra note 14, at 1754–56. 
154 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 (1981). 
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parties to agreements for consideration want and expect legal en-
forcement, and that the costs of requiring those parties to opt out 
of a nonenforcement default would be greater than the opt-out and 
error costs the existing enforcement default imposes on the minor-
ity of parties that prefer no legal liability. 
In What Price Contract? Karl Llewellyn challenged the second of 
those claims. He observed that “a business economy demands a 
means of quick, not one of ‘informal’ contracting,” and that a for-
mal expression of the parties’ intent to contract could be so cheap, 
quick, and transparent that its inconveniences would not “be so 
material as not to offer some hope of being outweighed by the gain 
in adequacy and unambiguity of proof .”155 It is at this point that we 
arrive at a second payoff of the above analysis. If there is an an-
swer to Llewellyn’s challenge, it lies in part in the relational costs 
of express opt-outs in even arms-length commercial transactions. 
The costs of opting into contractual liability expressly are not only 
the costs of uttering or writing down a few extra words, but the 
erosion of extralegal bases of trust between the parties. 
This argument rests on a theory that contract law functions to 
supplement, rather than transplant, extralegal assurances of per-
formance, such as reputation, trust, honor, and friendship. Conse-
quently, as a defense of the power-conferring reading of the Re-
statement rule, it might not be available to theorists, like Dori 
Kimel, who view contract as a substitute for those extralegal prom-
issory norms.156 It suggests that contract law as a whole takes more 
fully relational contracts as the paradigm, and that contract law is 
in this sense “relationally constituted.”157
The relational costs of express opt-outs also cast new light on the 
interplay between legal enforcement and extralegal norms. I have 
already mentioned Eisenberg’s worry that the enforcement of gra-
tuitous promises will “commodify[] the gift relationship.”158 Along 
similar lines, Kimel argues that contract liability can interfere with 
extralegal relationships of trust by casting “a thick and all-
155 Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 
704, 741 (1931). 
156 Kimel, supra note 11, at 57–60, 78–80 (2003). 
157 See Dori Kimel, The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on 
the Relational Model, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 233, 238, 250–53 (2007). 
158 Eisenberg, supra note 101, at 230. 
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encompassing veil over the motives and the attitudes towards each 
other attributable to parties to contracts.”159 And for somewhat dif-
ferent reasons, Seana Shiffrin has argued that the divergence be-
tween promise and the remedies for breach of contract “may some-
times make it harder for the morally decent person to behave 
decently.”160 All these theorists claim that the enforcement of 
promises threatens the moral relationship between promisor and 
promisee. The above analysis suggests that the interplay between 
contract law and extralegal relationships of trust is more complex. 
At least as important as the brooding background presence of legal 
enforcement are parties’ express invocations of the law, especially 
at the beginning of the relationship and often in response to incen-
tives that the law creates. 
While the power-conferring reading of the Restatement rule is 
not incoherent, my own view is that the better reading treats the 
rule as expressing a legal commitment to imposing duties on par-
ties to agreements for consideration for reasons that do not revolve 
around party choice. On this reading, the stickiness of the en-
forcement default is not a cost but a benefit. So too is the express 
opt-out rule that U.S. courts apply in practice. By requiring parties 
who do not want legal liability to say so expressly in a TINALEA 
clause, the rule not only gives them a new reason to inform courts 
of their choice, but also provides a test for the sophistication of the 
parties and the importance they place on opting out of enforce-
ment. The law will imply a duty to perform, except where parties 
knowingly undertake the expense, both out-of-pocket and rela-
tional, of expressly disclaiming that duty. 
One finds something like this idea too among Williston’s various 
arguments for the progenitor of the Restatement rule: 
In a system of law which makes no requirement of consideration, 
it may well be desirable to limit enforceable promises to those 
where a legal bond was contemplated, but in a system of law 
which does not enforce promises unless some benefit to the pro-
misor or detriment to the promisee has been asked and given, 
there is no propriety in such a limitation. . . . The views of parties 
159 Kimel, supra note 11, at 74. 
160 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. 
Rev. 708, 710 (2007). 
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to an agreement as to what are the requirements of a contract, as 
to what mutual assent means, or consideration, or what contracts 
are enforceable without a writing, and what are not, are . . . as 
immaterial as the views of an individual as to what constitutes a 
tort. In regard to both torts and contracts, the law, not the par-
ties, fixes the requirements of a legal obligation.161
Contract law is somewhat like tort law, in that both impose legal 
duties on persons not only because they expect, want, or intend 
them. Unlike the tort law, however, contract law also is designed to 
give persons the power to undertake purposively new obligations 
to one another. The Restatement rule and the exceptions to it 
function to balance these different and sometimes divergent inter-
ests. 
 
161 1 Williston 1920 Edition, supra note 23 § 21, at 21–22. Williston makes a similar 
argument from quasi-contractual liability, highlighting that “[e]ven where one party 
makes it clear to the other that he is unwilling to enter into a contract, the law may 
nevertheless impose one upon him.” Id. at 24. 
